the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

Chapter 6
THE OCCUPATION FALTERS
Political Aspects
By the end of the summer of 1942 the Germans had all but squandered
their opportunity to establish a workable administration in Russia. And
in so doing they had lost their chance to crush the growing partisan movement,
for large blocks of the Russian people had turned from them almost
to a man. Those natives who in 1941 had been pro-"liberator" had
turned apathetic, and those once apathetic had turned back to the
Soviets. In Great Russia where Communist influence had always been
heavy there had never been any serious question of allegiance. Many
large areas there had quickly gone under partisan control and the German
Army had not the troop strength to contest the loss. Elsewhere
many of the natives still worked for or with the invaders, but the seeds
of doubt and disappointment had been planted in their minds. Even
if it had been possible to solve the manpower problem in the rear and
retain all the security units for occupational duty and antipartisan operations,
the deterioration of popular morale and the consequent loss of
native support could hardly have been prevented, for the problem went
far deeper than a mere question of armed strength.
Hitler had sent the Wehrmacht into Russia to establish and enforce a
policy of blindly negative self-interest:
Germany wages war in the east for self-preservation, that is, in order
to gain the necessary living space for the German people, and in order
to improve the basis for a secure food supply for Europe, but particularly
for the German nation. It is not the purpose of, this war to lead the
people of the Soviet Union to a happier future, or to give them fu1l
freedom or political independence. 1
When the Russian, who had welcomed or at least acquiesced in the
invasion became aware of this attitude and of German plans for the
future, he slowly, and in many cases regretfully, turned away.
General Thomas, the chief of the Armed Forces Economic Office,
Von Weizsaecker, State Secretary in the German Foreign Office, and
Rosenberg, the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories had
all believed that the ultimate success of the war effort in the east would
hinge on the actions of the population, and all three had very nearly been
OKW/WPr, "Grundlagen der Propaganda gegen Wehnnacht und Voelker der
Sowjetunion," 23.III.42., in Heeresgruppe Nord, Propagandu Befehle. 75131/104.
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