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DOE 2000. - Waste Isolation Pilot Plant - U.S. Department of Energy

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WIPP RH PSAR <strong>DOE</strong>/WIPP-03-3174 CHAPTER 5<br />

The next step was to define the deviations from the intended function that could occur at each study node<br />

or process step. A combination <strong>of</strong> application <strong>of</strong> guide words and the knowledge based approach (see<br />

Section 3.1 <strong>of</strong> <strong>DOE</strong>/WIPP-99-2303 4 and WSMS-WIPP-00-0006 5 ) was used to identify the deviations.<br />

The HAZOP Teams agreed that with the exception <strong>of</strong> the natural phenomena and external events for<br />

which specific frequencies had already been determined, event initiators would be considered to occur<br />

with a frequency in the "anticipated" range (see Table 5.1-4). The frequencies for the natural phenomena<br />

events and external events were listed as identified in <strong>DOE</strong>/WIPP-95-2065. 24 The deviations identified<br />

for each study node are listed in Appendix C.<br />

Following identification <strong>of</strong> the deviations, causes and unmitigated consequences <strong>of</strong> those deviations were<br />

listed. As part <strong>of</strong> the qualitative determination <strong>of</strong> the consequences <strong>of</strong> each event, credit was taken<br />

initially only for the confinement and/or shielding expected to be provided by the road casks, the<br />

canisters, the drums, the facility cask, the Hot Cell and the WHB. No other preventive or mitigative<br />

features were assumed to be in place for determination <strong>of</strong> consequences.<br />

The consequences that were listed for each deviation identified in the HAZOPs were then "ranked"<br />

qualitatively using two sets <strong>of</strong> criteria. The first ranking was a "total rank" which included both<br />

radiological and non-radiological consequences. This ranking process used a two number system<br />

consisting <strong>of</strong> a qualitative unmitigated consequence based on the criteria given in Table 5.1-5, and a<br />

frequency ranking based on the levels given in Table 5.1-4. As stated previously, the frequency for all<br />

event initiators, with the exception <strong>of</strong> natural phenomena and external events, was considered to be in the<br />

"anticipated" range. This resulted in the "total rank" which is recorded in Appendix C.<br />

The "total" ranking for each deviation included both the resultant non-radiological and radiological<br />

consequences to the workers, the facility, and the <strong>of</strong>fsite public. The possibility <strong>of</strong> worker fatality from a<br />

non-radiological accident resulted in the assignment <strong>of</strong> the highest possible consequence ranking <strong>of</strong> four.<br />

The purpose <strong>of</strong> this initial ranking was to provide an indication <strong>of</strong> those areas where there was a potential<br />

to improve the level <strong>of</strong> general industrial safety for facility workers.<br />

The purpose <strong>of</strong> the second ranking was to identify those accidents that would pose the greatest<br />

radiological risk to the public, onsite workers, and the environment. This second ranking was based on<br />

the "radiological rank" consequence criteria given in Table 5.1-6. The radiological ranking was<br />

qualitatively estimated for each <strong>of</strong> three receptors: 1) the immediate worker, 2) the non-involved worker,<br />

and 3) the <strong>of</strong>fsite maximally exposed individual (MEI).<br />

The ultimate intent <strong>of</strong> the radiological ranking was to provide a means to select those potential accidents<br />

that would be <strong>of</strong> sufficient concern to be carried forward for quantitative accident analysis. For selection<br />

<strong>of</strong> candidate events for quantitative analysis, the consequences <strong>of</strong> each deviation were examined to focus<br />

only on risk posed by the accidental release <strong>of</strong> radiological material to the <strong>of</strong>fsite individual. The results<br />

<strong>of</strong> this ranking are listed in Appendix C using the same two number system and format as that used for<br />

the total rank: consequence first, frequency second.<br />

5.1-12 January 22, 2003

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