DOE 2000. - Waste Isolation Pilot Plant - U.S. Department of Energy

WIPP RH PSAR DOE/WIPP-03-3174 CHAPTER 5
Source Term Development - The maximum temperature of the waste canister will be #500 EF (260 EC)
from a potential hydraulic oil fire (event 7-10) as evaluated by the scoping Thermal Analysis. 33 The
waste canister has a carbon composite filter held in place by AREMCO 503 Ceramabond. 34 The
maximum temperature of the Ceramabond is 3000 EF (1649 EC). There will be no appreciable increase
in the internal pressure of the waste canister because the filter would stay in place during and after the fire
event. There will be no release of radioactivity.
Safety Structures, Systems, and Components - Based on the lack of release of radioactivity as supported
by the scoping Thermal Analysis, 33 Safety Class or Safety significant SSCs are not required. The
following data and assumptions are used in the thermal analysis:
C
Design and Location (>6 ft [1.8 m]) from the catch pans provided for the hydraulic unit of
facility cask rotating device) of the facility cask transfer car
C
C
Maximum volume of hydraulic oil in the facility cask rotating device is # 40 gal (151.4 L).
Capacity of the catch pans in the facility cask rotating device is > 45 gals (170.3 L).
The defense-in-depth SSCs which are applicable to this scenario, per the criteria in Chapter 3, Section
3.1.3 are assigned as follows:
C
Vented DOT Type A (or equivalent) RH Canister - Primary confinement
C
C
C
C
WHB Structure - Secondary confinement
WHB RH HVAC System - Secondary confinement
WHB HEPA Filters - Secondary confinement
Design of Hydraulic Oil Reservoir - Designed to minimize leaks
Section 5.2.4.1, Evaluation of the Design Basis, discusses in greater detail: (1) the evaluation of safety
SSCs and (2) the applicability of functional and performance requirements (system evaluation) and
controls (TSRs). Detailed design descriptions for the above defense-in-depth SSCs may be found in
Chapter 4 and the applicable SDDs.
Due to the importance of the WIPP Emergency Management Program, 36 TSR ACs are derived in Chapter
6 and required in the WIPP TSR document.
5.2.3.3 RH3 Loss of Confinement in the WHB
Scenario Description - The HAZOP 28 postulated a LOC of the waste material in the WHB. The HAZOP
postulated three hazardous events (7-1, 7-2, and 7-6) that could result in a LOC of the waste material in
the WHB. The LOC events could cause a significant release of radioactivity.
Hazardous event 7-1 postulates a movement of shuttle car while grapple hoist is lifting the waste canister.
The causes of this event are mechanical failure or control loop failure during lifting of the waste canister.
The potential consequences of this event are: breach of a waste canister, damage to shuttle car, spread of
contamination, direct radiological exposure, radiological impact offsite, and worker fatality. The
potential breach of a waste canister could cause a significant release of radioactivity to the environment.
5.2-25 January 22, 2003