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DOE 2000. - Waste Isolation Pilot Plant - U.S. Department of Energy

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WIPP RH PSAR <strong>DOE</strong>/WIPP-03-3174 CHAPTER 5<br />

analysis 6 . The 30 seconds is based on 10 seconds to stop the waste handling activity once the accident<br />

has occurred and 20 seconds to examine the cask or drums and determine a breach has occurred and<br />

begin to exit from the area. The 30 second time frame specifically excludes a disabled worker scenario (a<br />

worker injured by the accident). Therefore, the worker will be exposed to the cloud from 15 seconds (T 1<br />

in the equation 5-10) when the cloud reaches him to 30 seconds (T 2 in the equation 5-10) when he leaves<br />

the area. Substituting these values into the above equation and reducing:<br />

D = (Q * 3.33E-04 m 3 /s * 5.1E+08 rem/Ci) * [3/(4π(0.25 m/s) 3 )] * ((15 s) -2 - (30 s) -2 ) (5-11)<br />

D = Q (Ci) * 8.65E+03 (rem/Ci) (5-12)<br />

This is the form <strong>of</strong> the consequence equation that will be used in this analysis to determine the<br />

radiological dose to the immediate worker due to the accidents occurring while processing a 10-160B<br />

cask.<br />

For the assessment <strong>of</strong> consequences to workers in the Underground, the source term is assumed to be<br />

released instantaneously into a slug <strong>of</strong> air with a volume <strong>of</strong> 850 ft 3 (24 m 3 ). This volume is based on an<br />

instantaneous release and the assumed ventilation flow rate <strong>of</strong> 2 ft [0.6 m] per second, and the<br />

dimensions <strong>of</strong> the underground exhaust drift, or<br />

V = (2 ft/s [0.6 m/s]) * (1 sec) * (33 ft [10 m] ) * (13 ft [4 m]) = 24 m 3 .<br />

A volumetric flow <strong>of</strong> 25 m 3 was used for the assessment <strong>of</strong> consequences to the workers in the<br />

Underground and for <strong>Waste</strong> Hoist accidents.<br />

5.2.2 Off-site and On-site Risk Evaluation Guidelines<br />

The evaluation guidelines that are established should not be regarded as a "bright line" criterion and<br />

doses challenging the guidelines or in the rem range should indicate the need to consider classifying<br />

preventative or mitigative SSCs as safety class.<br />

Guidelines do not exist for the frequency range <strong>of</strong> beyond extremely unlikely (frequency # 1E-06/yr).<br />

The consequences <strong>of</strong> accidents in that range are conservatively evaluated against the guidelines for the<br />

extremely unlikely range for the sole purpose <strong>of</strong> evaluating the risk associated with facility operations.<br />

5.2.2.1 Radiological Risk Evaluation Guidelines<br />

Off-site radiological dose criteria for accident analyses have been well established by national standards<br />

through the licensing process <strong>of</strong> nuclear facilities regulated by the NRC. These criteria are based on the<br />

probabilities <strong>of</strong> occurrence <strong>of</strong> the accidents or events hypothesized for the accident analysis. For nuclear<br />

power plants, the operational accidents or events are classified as <strong>Plant</strong> Conditions (PC) in accordance<br />

with the estimated frequency <strong>of</strong> occurrence. 23, 24 This established scheme (ANSI/ANS-51.1) 23 has been<br />

adopted by the WIPP to compare accidental releases from postulated events to dose limits based on<br />

estimated frequency <strong>of</strong> occurrence. Table 5.2-1a summarizes the risk evaluation guidelines for the<br />

assessment <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>f-site radiological exposures.<br />

5.2-17 January 22, 2003

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