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DOE 2000. - Waste Isolation Pilot Plant - U.S. Department of Energy

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WIPP RH PSAR <strong>DOE</strong>/WIPP-03-3174 CHAPTER 5<br />

General areas <strong>of</strong> concern identified include:<br />

Fires<br />

Explosions<br />

Internal and external conditions that may lead to a breach or rupture <strong>of</strong> the 10-160B cask, drums,<br />

facility canister and 72B waste canisters which could result in the airborne release <strong>of</strong> radiological<br />

materials.<br />

Direct radiological exposure <strong>of</strong> personnel to high radiation and airborne radiological activity.<br />

Worker injury or fatality.<br />

External waste container surface contamination and need for decontamination.<br />

Major damage to equipment and facility.<br />

Major disruption <strong>of</strong> process operations.<br />

The consequences <strong>of</strong> each deviation were developed without mitigating systems in place (with the<br />

exception <strong>of</strong> the confinement and/or shielding provided by the casks, canisters, and the WHB) and are<br />

listed in Appendix C. Appendix C also provides a listing, identified by the HAZOP Team, <strong>of</strong> the<br />

substantial safeguards currently existing at the WIPP facility to reduce the likelihood <strong>of</strong> the identified<br />

deviations and to mitigate the consequences <strong>of</strong> such deviations. Identified safeguards include design<br />

features such as radiation shielding, building structure, ventilation system, and casks; administrative<br />

control features such as procedures, worker training, preventive maintenance and inspection programs,<br />

and the WIPP RH WAC. 10<br />

5.1.4.2 Selection <strong>of</strong> RH Potential Accidents<br />

To assess the relative radiological risk to the <strong>of</strong>fsite individual, the frequency and radiological<br />

consequence rankings for that receptor were "binned" using the Risk Ranking Matrix given in<br />

Table 5.1-7. The resulting risk in each case was categorized as acceptable ( having low risk), moderate,<br />

or high as defined on the matrix. Those deviations which had an <strong>of</strong>fsite ranking with a frequency and<br />

consequence combination that is in the matrix area, or "bin", indicating low risk and concern were<br />

excluded from further consideration for quantitative evaluation. The events which impact the <strong>of</strong>fsite<br />

public and have risk that falls in the darker shaded area on the risk matrix should be considered<br />

"situations <strong>of</strong> major concern" as described in <strong>DOE</strong>-STD-3009-94, 3 with sufficiently high risk that these<br />

events might be considered "unique" and individual examination might be used in the accident analysis<br />

phase. The events that impact the <strong>of</strong>fsite individual and fall in the lighter shaded area in Table 5.1-7 are<br />

considered "situations <strong>of</strong> moderate concern" that yield a subset <strong>of</strong> "representative" events needing further<br />

examination. Representative events bound a number <strong>of</strong> similar events <strong>of</strong> lesser risk (the worst fire for a<br />

number <strong>of</strong> similar fires). At least one event from each <strong>of</strong> the event types is considered representative.<br />

Representative events are examined only to the extent that they are not bounded by unique events.<br />

Table 5.1-8 lists the deviations considered to have a "radiological rank" which indicated moderate<br />

(lighter shaded area on Table 5.1-7) or high risk (darker shaded area on Table 5.1-7) to the <strong>of</strong>fsite<br />

individual as determined by the binning process. The 17 hazardous events were selected as potential<br />

candidates for quantitative analysis. The frequency <strong>of</strong> an aircraft crash into WHB (hazardous event 13-7<br />

in Table C-1) is beyond extremely unlikely based on the physical size <strong>of</strong> the WHB and the frequency <strong>of</strong><br />

the flights within 5 miles <strong>of</strong> WIPP 24 . The consequences <strong>of</strong> the Underground Ro<strong>of</strong> Fall 31 (hazardous event<br />

14-1 in Table C-1) are negligible to the public and onsite worker, and low to immediate worker because<br />

<strong>of</strong> the storage location and design <strong>of</strong> the RH 72-B waste canister and the facility canister.<br />

5.1-16 January 22, 2003

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