DOE 2000. - Waste Isolation Pilot Plant - U.S. Department of Energy

WIPP RH PSAR DOE/WIPP-03-3174 CHAPTER 5
Assessment of Immediate Worker Consequences- As discussed in Section 5.2.1.2, this scenario is not
evaluated for immediate worker consequences.
Safety Structures, Systems, and Components - No hazardous material is postulated to be released during
the DBT; therefore, Safety Class or Safety Significant SSCs are not required. The following input data
and assumptions are used in the analysis:
C
The 72B cask is designed to withstand the effects of high wind, tornado, tornado driven
missiles, and overturning without the release of waste contents as part of the RH-TRU 72-B
road cask safety analysis report 49 .
C
The WHB (including the cranes and grapple hoist used for RH waste handling) and waste hoist
are protected by the WHB structure, and the tornado doors.
The defense-in-depth SSCs which are applicable to this scenario, per the criteria provided in Chapter 3,
Section 3.1.3 are assigned as follows:
C
WHB structure (includes structure and structural components which includes the cranes and
grapple hoist used for RH waste handling) designed to prevent failure during a DBT resulting
in a loss of secondary confinement
Additionally, the main lateral force resisting members of the Support Building and Building 412 are DBT
designed to protect the WHB from their structural failure.
Section 5.2.4.1 discusses in greater detail: (1) the evaluation of safety SSCs, and (2) the applicability of
functional and performance requirements (system evaluation) and controls (TSRs). Due to the
importance of DBT qualification, and programs relating to configuration and document control, quality
assurance, preventative maintenance and inspection, the WIPP RH WAC, and the WIPP Emergency
Management Program, in the WIPP defense-in-depth strategy for this accident, TSR ACs are derived in
Chapter 6 and required in the WIPP TSR Document.
5.2.3.9 RH8 Aircraft
Scenario Description - The possibility of an aircraft crash into the WHB has been identified as part of the
HAZOP performed for the CH TRU waste handling system. This scenario represents an external
accident which may involve the potential breach of waste containers. It is postulated that a military or
civilian aircraft crashes into the WHB. DOE-STD-3014-96, Accident Analysis for Aircraft Crash into
Hazardous Facilities, 53 provides criteria for the development of frequencies of aircraft accidents used in
analyses for nuclear power plants and for crash frequency contributions associated with airport operations
(takeoffs and landings), and federal airway activity (overflights).
As described in Chapter 2, two federal ten-mile wide airways (one jet route and one low-altitude route)
pass within five miles of the WIPP. Traffic data show that the combined traffic is about 28 instrument
flight rule flights per day.
There are no airports or approaches within a five-mile radius of the WIPP. The nearest airstrip, twelve
miles north of the site, and privately owned by Transwestern (TW) Pipeline Co. is no longer in use and
TW filed for abandonment in 1990 with the Federal Aviation Administration. The nearest commercial
airport is in Carlsbad (28 miles to the west).
5.2-46 January 22, 2003