DOE 2000. - Waste Isolation Pilot Plant - U.S. Department of Energy

WIPP RH PSAR DOE/WIPP-03-3174 CHAPTER 1
Supporting the second and third layers of defense-in-depth, WIPP PTSR ACs are identified which
establish programs for radiation protection and emergency management. Basic elements and
requirements defined for TSR AC programs are enforced by the associated implementing WIPP
procedures.
1.3.3 Safety Analysis Conclusions
1.3.3.1 Safety Analysis Overview
Safety analysis was performed for the WIPP to ensure that: 1) potential hazards are systematically
identified, 2) unique and representative hazards that may develop into accidents are evaluated, 3)
applicable reasonable measures to eliminate, control, or mitigate the accidents are taken, and 4) safety
(safety-class or safety-significant) SSCs and accident specific TSRs, based on comparison of accident
consequences to the MEI to the off-site evaluation guidelines and the immediate worker and
non-involved worker to the on-site risk evaluation guidelines, are identified.
The predicted RH waste (radioactive/chemical) to be received in a waste container at the WIPP was
conservatively estimated based on data, as shown in the BIR 27 , from the generating sites, process
knowledge, and limiting criteria provided in the RH WAC. 16 These estimates provided bounding
container inventories used in the determination of potential consequences from postulated accidents.
Hazards associated with the facility RH processes were evaluated through two systematic hazard analysis
processes, a 72B HAZOP and a 10-160B HAZOP. The analyses encompassed waste receipt, handling
and disposal of RH TRU waste in the WIPP. Each hazards analysis involved a multi-step process which
included: 1) identification of the potential hazards associated with the RH TRU waste handling processes,
2) characterization of the waste expected at the WIPP, and 3) a hazard evaluation in the form of a
12, 13
HAZOP. These multi-step processes provided comprehensive examinations of the potential hazards
which may require quantitative evaluation in the accident analysis.
The major hazard associated with the RH TRU waste handling process is associated with the radiological
and non-radiological hazardous materials within the waste container. Hazards associated with mining
operations are considered standard industrial hazards governed by OSHA and MSHA regulations and are
considered only when they may be an initiating event leading to the accidental release of radiological or
non-radiological hazardous materials. Waste handling operations at the WIPP do not involve high
temperature and pressure systems, electromagnetic fields or the use of toxic material in large quantities
outside of the waste canisters. Therefore, for the purposes of establishing an inventory of radiological
and non-radiological material, only that material contained in the waste containers was considered.
The hazard analysis process identified potential accident scenarios in the categories of: 1) operational
accidents (caused by initiators internal to the facility), 2) natural phenomena events (e.g., earthquakes,
tornadoes), and 3) external events (caused by man made initiators external to the facility). These
potential accident scenarios were then qualitatively ranked in terms of consequence to the public and
relative probability to determine unique and representative accidents for further quantitative analysis see
Table 5.1-10.
Review of the WIPP Land Management Plan 36 indicates that public access to the WIPP 16-section area
up to the exclusive use area shown in Figure 5.2-1 is allowed for grazing purposes, and up to the
DOE "off limits area" for recreational purposes. The location of the MEI is at the "closest point of public
access," or the DOE "exclusive use area" boundary which is consistent with guidance for the
implementation of 40 CFR 191, 37 Subpart A. Calculations are performed in Appendix E for a member of
the public at the site boundary for reference purposes.
1.3-16 January 24, 2003