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DOE 2000. - Waste Isolation Pilot Plant - U.S. Department of Energy

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WIPP RH PSAR <strong>DOE</strong>/WIPP-03-3174 CHAPTER 5<br />

handling. The probability ranges from 1.0E-02 to 2.0E-03, with one outlier probability reported as 0.25.<br />

The use <strong>of</strong> a conditional probability <strong>of</strong> waste drum failure due to being stuck by the PAR manipulator<br />

arm would be highly conservative. It is unlikely that the PAR manipulator is strong enough to actually<br />

puncture a waste drum and most events in which the arm did strike a drum would involve glancing<br />

blows. In addition, slip clutches have been provided at each joint (shoulder, elbow, and wrist) to prevent<br />

a drum from being punctured. As the robotic arm is manipulated, rotated, or extended from any<br />

orientation and contacts the drum lid, the manipulator stops the motion that the operator is directing from<br />

the control console. The operator may still have the controls engaged but the arm will not continue in the<br />

path <strong>of</strong> travel. One additional event to be considered is a strike while lowering the manipulator arm with<br />

the telescoping tube hoist. The telescoping tube hoist is lowered by cable and has a cable slack limit<br />

switch. The switch is provided to detect cable slack that may occur during full extension or when an<br />

obstruction is encountered. This precludes the hook from being forced into the drum. The smaller<br />

estimate <strong>of</strong> the probability <strong>of</strong> 2.00E-03 is divided by 2 because <strong>of</strong> the slip clutches being used. The<br />

frequency <strong>of</strong> hazardous event 10A-1 is: 2080 operations/yr * 1.0E-03 * 1.0E-03 = 2.1E-03/yr. The<br />

frequency <strong>of</strong> NC3-E is in the "unlikely" range (10 -2 /yr $frequency >10 -4 /yr) and its consequences <strong>of</strong> NC3-<br />

E are compared against the Evaluation Guidelines for the "unlikely" frequency range.<br />

Since this event involves puncturing a single waste drum, the CD equals 1.<br />

Since it is assumed that all <strong>of</strong> the radiological material from an entire 10-160B cask is located in a single<br />

waste drum, the MAR is 20 PE-Ci (CD x CI). As with the radiological MAR, in determining the<br />

non-radiological MAR it is assumed that one waste drum in the Hot Cell is punctured. Therefore, it is<br />

assumed that the non-radiological MAR is the content <strong>of</strong> 1 waste drum (CD = 1). Therefore, the<br />

non-radiological MAR is limited to the hazardous material content <strong>of</strong> 1 waste drum or 243 pounds.<br />

The waste drums are DOT Type A containers. From section 5.2.1.1, the DR for DOT Type A waste<br />

drums that are breached by impact with waste handling equipment is 0.05. The DR for this event is 0.05.<br />

Estimated Noninvolved Worker and MEI Consequences and Comparison to Risk Evaluation Guidelines -<br />

Based on the values for the source term variables as presented above, the worst-case, no-mitigation MEI<br />

and noninvolved worker consequences (Appendix E Tables E-38 and E-39) <strong>of</strong> NC3-E are well within the<br />

radiological and non-radiological risk evaluation guidelines for the unlikely range. The non-radiological<br />

results meet the guidelines (i.e., the sum <strong>of</strong> ratios < 1) when all the chemicals are added (Tables E-40 and<br />

E-41).<br />

Assessment <strong>of</strong> Immediate Worker Consequences - No immediate worker consequences are calculated for<br />

NC3-E because no workers are in the Hot Cell where the event occurs.<br />

NC3-F Puncture <strong>of</strong> Drum or Canister Outside Hot Cell Accident Scenario:<br />

NC3-F is composed <strong>of</strong> hazardous events 12E-2, 12E-3, 12E-4, and 14B-1.<br />

Hazardous event 12E-2 postulates the Hot Cell shield valve inadvertently closing on a facility canister<br />

and shearing the canister. The causes <strong>of</strong> this event are mechanical-electrical failure or control system<br />

failure. The frequency <strong>of</strong> event 12E-2 is a function <strong>of</strong> the number <strong>of</strong> facility canisters processed through<br />

the Hot Cell in a year and the probability <strong>of</strong> spurious closure <strong>of</strong> the Hot Cell shield valve during<br />

movement <strong>of</strong> the canister. 693 facility canisters will be processed through the Hot Cell and Transfer Cell<br />

in a year. The PLG1317 38 evaluation <strong>of</strong> the probability <strong>of</strong> the shield valve closing on a waste canister is<br />

2.00E-13 per transfer. The frequency <strong>of</strong> event 12E-2 is: 693 transfers/yr * 2.00E-13 = 1.4E-10/yr or<br />

"beyond extremely unlikely" (10 -6 /yr $frequency).<br />

5.2-61 January 22, 2003

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