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DOE 2000. - Waste Isolation Pilot Plant - U.S. Department of Energy

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WIPP RH PSAR <strong>DOE</strong>/WIPP-03-3174 CHAPTER 5<br />

Estimated Noninvolved Worker and MEI Consequences and Comparison to Risk Evaluation Guidelines -<br />

Based on the values for the source term variables as presented above, the worst-case, no-mitigation MEI<br />

and noninvolved worker consequences (Appendix E Tables E-18 and E-19) <strong>of</strong> event 9-1 are well within<br />

the radiological and non-radiological risk evaluation guidelines for the extremely unlikely range. The<br />

non-radiological results meet the guidelines (i.e., the sum <strong>of</strong> ratios < 1) when all the chemicals are added<br />

(Tables E-20 and E-21).<br />

Assessment <strong>of</strong> Immediate Worker Consequences - No immediate worker consequences are calculated for<br />

NC1 because no workers are in the Hot Cell, the operation is done remotely.<br />

Safety Structures, Systems, and Components - Based on the consequence analysis results for this<br />

accident, Safety Class or Safety Significant SSCs are not required. The following input data and<br />

assumptions are used in the frequency and source term analyses:<br />

C<br />

Maximum PE-Ci content <strong>of</strong> 10-160B cask is 20 PE-Ci.<br />

C<br />

C<br />

C<br />

C<br />

C<br />

C<br />

A combustible materials control program is established for the Hot Cell that ensures insufficient<br />

fuel and location <strong>of</strong> fuel so that a fire in the Hot Cell would not be <strong>of</strong> sufficient magnitude to<br />

damage multiple waste drums.<br />

The Hot Cell walls constitute an effective fire barrier to keep a fire originating outside the Hot<br />

Cell from propagating into the Hot Cell and to keep a fire that originates inside the Hot Cell from<br />

propagating to outside areas.<br />

The maximum hazardous material weight contained in a waste drum is 243 pounds.<br />

No more than six fully loaded and one partially loaded facility canisters are stored in the Hot Cell<br />

at any one time. Also, only ten waste drums removed from a 10-160B cask and not in facility<br />

canisters can be in the Hot Cell.<br />

The hazardous chemical inventory in the RH waste is the same as for the CH waste.<br />

A 10-160B cask can contain no more than 10 waste drums.<br />

C Total number <strong>of</strong> waste drums handled in one year in the Hot Cell is 2080.<br />

The defense-in-depth SSCs which are applicable to this scenario, per the criteria in Chapter 3, Section<br />

3.1.3 are assigned as follows:<br />

C<br />

Vented DOT Type A waste drum - primary confinement<br />

C<br />

C<br />

WHB Ventilation System - secondary confinement<br />

Design <strong>of</strong> Hot Cell - designed to minimize fires<br />

5.2.3.11 NC2 Fire in the Underground<br />

According to Section 5.2.3.1 (RH1), the fire in the underground that causes a release <strong>of</strong> hazardous<br />

materials (radioactive and chemicals) from the facility cask or from a 72B waste canister is not possible.<br />

Therefore, a fire during processing the facility cask containing a facility canister <strong>of</strong> 10-160B waste in the<br />

underground would not cause a release <strong>of</strong> the hazardous materials. The design features and controls<br />

credited in the Section 5.2.3.1 will be applicable during the processing <strong>of</strong> 10-160B waste.<br />

5.2.3.12 NC3 Loss <strong>of</strong> Confinement in the WHB<br />

5.2-51 January 22, 2003

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