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DOE 2000. - Waste Isolation Pilot Plant - U.S. Department of Energy

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WIPP RH PSAR <strong>DOE</strong>/WIPP-03-3174 CHAPTER 1<br />

The second layer <strong>of</strong> defense-in-depth provides protection against anticipated and unlikely operational<br />

events that might occur in spite <strong>of</strong> the protection afforded by the first layer <strong>of</strong> defense. The second<br />

defense layer is characterized by detection and protection systems, and controls that: (1) indicate<br />

component, system, or process performance degradation created by compromises <strong>of</strong> the first layer, and<br />

(2) provide adequate mitigation and accommodation <strong>of</strong> the consequences <strong>of</strong> those operational accidents<br />

which may occur. The WHB and underground radiation monitoring systems, the HEPA filtration<br />

systems, and the WIPP emergency management program 25 provide this layer <strong>of</strong> defense-in-depth.<br />

The third layer <strong>of</strong> defense-in-depth supplements the first two layers by providing protection against<br />

extremely unlikely operational, natural phenomena, and external events. These events represent extreme<br />

cases <strong>of</strong> failures and are analyzed in Section 5.2.3 using conservative assumptions and calculations to<br />

assess the radiological and non-radiological effects <strong>of</strong> such accidents on the maximally exposed<br />

individual (MEI), non-involved worker, and immediate worker to verify that a conservative design basis<br />

has been established. These accidents include waste canister/drum fire and waste hoist failure.<br />

1.3.1.5 <strong>Waste</strong> Acceptance Criteria<br />

The waste accepted for placement in the WIPP facility must conform with the RH WAC 16 unless an<br />

exception to the RH WAC 16 has been approved as a result <strong>of</strong> examination in relation to the SAR. Based<br />

on the hazards and accident analyses presented in Chapter 5, specific waste characteristics used in the<br />

development <strong>of</strong> the safety analysis, are required in Chapter 6 to be incorporated as RH WAC Operations<br />

and Safety Requirements. A PTSR AC for <strong>Waste</strong> Characteristics require that the safety analysis criteria<br />

be incorporated into the RH WAC. 16<br />

The RH WAC 16 establishes minimum criteria that the waste must meet, and limits that cannot be<br />

exceeded in order to ensure that TRU waste is managed and disposed <strong>of</strong> in a manner that protects worker<br />

and public health and safety and the environment. The following waste is unacceptable for management<br />

at the WIPP facility:<br />

Ç<br />

Ignitable, reactive, and corrosive waste<br />

Ç<br />

Ç<br />

Ç<br />

Ç<br />

Liquid wastes (all waste must meet the RH WAC 16 criteria regarding residual liquid content)<br />

Compressed gases<br />

Incompatible waste (waste must be compatible with backfill, seal and panel closure materials,<br />

canister, road cask, facility cask, and as well as with other waste)<br />

Headspace-gas VOC concentrations resulting in average annual emissions not protective <strong>of</strong><br />

human health and the environment<br />

Ç <strong>Waste</strong>s with EPA codes not listed on Hazardous <strong>Waste</strong> Facility Permit, Table II.C 26 .<br />

Ç<br />

<strong>Waste</strong> with equal to or more than 50 ppm (50 mg/L) polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB)<br />

The WIPP facility will not accept waste that exhibits the characteristics <strong>of</strong> ignitability, reactivity, or<br />

corrosiveness.<br />

1.3-4 January 24, 2003

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