DOE 2000. - Waste Isolation Pilot Plant - U.S. Department of Energy

WIPP RH PSAR DOE/WIPP-03-3174 CHAPTER 5
C
C
C
C
There is not another facility cask containing a RH waste canister or any CH waste in the path of
the forklift transporting a filled facility cask to the disposal room.
72B waste canisters are vented
A spotter is present when a RH waste canister is transported by the forklift in the Underground.
Maximum volume of diesel fuel in the forklift is # 20 gal (75.7 L).
The defense-in-depth SSCs which are applicable to this scenario, per the criteria in Chapter 3, Section
3.1.3 are assigned as follows:
C
Vented DOT Type A (or equivalent) RH canister - Primary confinement
C
C
Underground Ventilation System - Secondary confinement
Design of Fuel and Hydraulic Oil Tanks- Designed to minimize leaks
Section 5.2.4.1, Evaluation of the Design Basis, discusses in greater detail: (1) the evaluation of safety
SSCs and (2) the applicability of functional and performance requirements (system evaluation) and
controls (TSRs). Detailed design descriptions for the above defense-in-depth SSCs may be found in the
applicable SDDs as referenced in Chapter 4.
Due to the importance of the WIPP Emergency Management Program, 36 TSR ACs are derived in Chapter
6 and required in the WIPP TSR document.
5.2.3.2 RH2 Fire in the WHB
Scenario Description - The HAZOP 28 postulated a waste canister breach from a fire in the WHB. The
HAZOP postulated hazardous event (7-10) that could result in a fire in the WHB. The fire could cause a
significant release of radioactivity.
The hazardous event 7-10 postulates a hydraulic oil fire in the Facility Cask Loading Room. The cause
of this event is a hydraulic oil leak from the facility cask rotating device. The facility cask rotating
device usually has about 40 gals (151.4 L) of hydraulic oil 37 . An ignition source could ignite this fuel
and cause a fire. According to the MSDS, the hydraulic oil is slightly flammable (NFPA rating of 1) 30 .
The fire could potentially damage the facility cask and waste canister and cause a breach of the waste
canister because neither the facility cask or the waste canister are qualified for a fire. The thermal stress
on the breached waste canister could cause a significant release of radioactivity. The immediate
worker(s) could also receive a significant direct radiological exposure from the breached waste canister.
Preventive and Mitigative Features - General preventive and mitigative measures identified in the
HAZOP for this specific scenario are listed in Table 5.1-10.
Estimated Frequency - The HAZOP Team qualitatively estimated the frequency of occurrence of a fire in
the WHB to be in the anticipated range (10 -1 $ frequency>10 -2 ) for the hazardous event 7-10. This
frequency is conservative because there are no known ignition sources that could ignite hydraulic oil.
5.2-24 January 22, 2003