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DOE 2000. - Waste Isolation Pilot Plant - U.S. Department of Energy

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WIPP RH PSAR <strong>DOE</strong>/WIPP-03-3174 CHAPTER 5<br />

For this accident scenario it is assumed that the entire 20 PE-Ci inventory is located in a single waste<br />

drum (CI = 20 PE-Ci). This event involves dropping an object on the waste drums in the 10-160B cask<br />

while it is in the CUR. Only one 10-160B cask can be processed through the CUR at one time, therefore<br />

only the ten waste drums contained in the 10-160B cask being processed are subject to the direct effects<br />

<strong>of</strong> a dropped object. Since it is assumed that all <strong>of</strong> the radiological material from an entire 10-160B cask<br />

is located in a single waste drum, assuming that all ten drums are impacted is equivalent to one drum<br />

containing all <strong>of</strong> the radiological material is damaged. For the radiological source term analysis, it is<br />

assumed that only one waste drum is breached by a dropped object, resulting in a release <strong>of</strong> the<br />

radiological material (CD = 1). The MAR for this event is 20 PE-Ci (CD x CI).<br />

For the non-radiological MAR it is assumed that only the ten waste drums contained in the 10-160B cask<br />

being processed in the CUR are subject to the effects <strong>of</strong> a dropped object. However, the waste drums in<br />

the 10-160B cask are in two drum carriages, each containing 5 waste drums. Only the waste drum<br />

carriage on the top would be directly impacted by the dropped object. Therefore, it is assumed that the<br />

non-radiological MAR is the content <strong>of</strong> 5 waste drums (CD = 5). The non-radiological MAR is limited<br />

to the hazardous material content <strong>of</strong> 5 waste drums or 1215 pounds.<br />

The DR in this case is determined based on the amount <strong>of</strong> damage the waste drum receives as<br />

a result <strong>of</strong> the impact and how much <strong>of</strong> the contents are exposed as a result. As discussed above it is<br />

conservatively assumed that the DR is (4 x 0.025 = ) 0.1 for this event.<br />

Estimated Noninvolved Worker and MEI Consequences and Comparison to Risk Evaluation Guidelines -<br />

Based on the values for the source term variables as presented above, the worst-case, no-mitigation MEI<br />

and noninvolved worker consequences (Appendix E Tables E-26 and E-27) <strong>of</strong> NC3-B are well within the<br />

radiological and non-radiological risk evaluation guidelines for the unlikely range. The non-radiological<br />

results meet the guidelines (i.e., the sum <strong>of</strong> ratios < 1) when all the chemicals are added (Tables E-28 and<br />

E-29).<br />

Assessment <strong>of</strong> Immediate Worker Consequences - No immediate worker consequences are calculated for<br />

NC3-B because no workers are in the CUR where the event occurs.<br />

NC3-C Dropped Drum or Canister in Hot Cell Accident Scenario:<br />

NC3-C is composed <strong>of</strong> hazardous events 10B-1, 10BF-1, and 11F-1. All <strong>of</strong> which involve dropping a<br />

waste drum or loaded facility canister inside the Hot Cell.<br />

Hazardous event 10B-1 postulates that while lifting a drum, the drum lid comes <strong>of</strong>f. The causes <strong>of</strong> this<br />

event are human error, equipment failure and drum lid failure. The frequency <strong>of</strong> event 10B-1 is a<br />

function <strong>of</strong> the number <strong>of</strong> drums lifted for placement in a facility canister each year and the probability <strong>of</strong><br />

the drum lid failing during the lift. From examination <strong>of</strong> the drum and lifting process, it is concluded<br />

that the lid falling <strong>of</strong>f during a lift is not a credible event. The ICC-17C 55 gallon drum has a cable lift<br />

fixture attached below the first rolling hoop prior to initial drum loading as shown in Figure 4.2-11. The<br />

loaded drums were placed in the drum carriage for shipment using the cable lift fixture at the shipping<br />

site. The lift cables are placed over the crane hook and the lift executed. This exerts a force on the drum<br />

lid ring tending to hold the lid in place. The lift cables are symmetric around the drum to ensure there is<br />

no load shift. During the lift, the lift cable forces hold the lid in place.<br />

5.2-57 January 22, 2003

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