DOE 2000. - Waste Isolation Pilot Plant - U.S. Department of Energy

WIPP RH PSAR DOE/WIPP-03-3174 CHAPTER 5
C
Maximum time to transfer one waste canister to the emplacement equipment in the Underground
is approximately 4 hours
The defense-in-depth SSCs which are applicable to this scenario, per the criteria in Chapter 3, Section
3.1.3 are assigned as follows:
C
Vented DOT Type A (or equivalent) waste canister - primary confinement
C
C
C
C
C
C
Underground Ventilation Exhaust System - secondary confinement
Radiation Monitoring System (active waste disposal room exit alpha CAM for underground shift
to filtration) - secondary confinement
Underground Ventilation Exhaust HEPA Filters - secondary confinement
Central Monitoring System (for actuation of underground shift to filtration only) - secondary
confinement
Forklift and Attachments - Designed to minimize waste canister drops
Design of facility cask - Prevents/minimizes releases from the waste canister
The defense-in-depth ACs which are applicable to this scenario, per the criteria in Chapter 3, Section
3.1.3 are assigned as follows:
C
No other vehicle movement is allowed during RH waste movement in the Underground.
Section 5.2.4.1, Evaluation of the Design Basis, discusses in greater detail: (1) the evaluation of safety
SSCs, and (2) the applicability of functional and performance requirements (system evaluation) and
controls (TSRs). Detailed design descriptions for the above defense-in-depth SSCs may be found in the
applicable SDDs as referenced in Chapter 4.
Due to the importance of WIPP programs relating to configuration and document control, quality
assurance, conduct of operations, preventative maintenance and inspection, waste handling procedures
and training, the WIPP RH WAC, and the WIPP Emergency Management Program 36 and associated
procedures, in the WIPP defense-in-depth strategy for this accident, TSR ACs are derived in Chapter 6
and required in the WIPP TSR Document.
5.2.3.6 RH5 Fire Followed by Explosion in the Underground
Scenario Description - The HAZOP 28 postulated a fire followed by explosion in the Underground. The
HAZOP 28 postulated two hazardous events (9-8 and 10-3) that could result in a fire followed by
explosion in the Underground. The fire and subsequent explosion could cause a significant release of
radioactivity.
Hazardous event 9-8 postulated a diesel fuel fire followed by explosion on forklift during the transfer of
facility cask to disposal room. The forklift usually has about 20 gals (75.7 L) of diesel fuel. The cause
of this event is a diesel fuel leak. An ignition source could ignite the fuel and cause a fire and then a
subsequent explosion. The fire and subsequent explosion could potentially damage the facility cask and
waste canister and cause a breach of the waste canister because neither the facility cask or the waste
canister are qualified for a fire or explosion. The thermal and explosive stress on the waste canister could
5.2-38 January 22, 2003