Beate Dignas & Engelbert Winter - Kaveh Farrokh

60 1 Political goals
In the fourth century the Sasanians still referred to the Achaemenid
dynasty in order to legitimise their own territorial claims. The contemporary
historian Ammianus Marcellinus, whose knowledge of the situation
in the East was extensive, includes a letter of the Sasanian king ˇ Sāpūr II
(309–79) in his work. In this letter, the king demands that the Roman
emperor Constantius II return Armenia and Mesopotamia and in addition
to these all territories to the Strymon river and the borders of Macedonia
which had belonged to his ancestors. 25 Elsewhere the author reiterates that
ˇSāpūr II claimed territories reaching as far as Bithynia and the coasts of
the Sea of Marmara. 26 E. Kettenhofen raises the objection that the Roman
historian does not quote ˇ Sāpūr literally and that the letter should not be
viewed as an authentic testimony. However, there is no reason to believe
that the king’s letter did not include the phrase ad usque Strymona flumen
et Macedonicos fines. We would not do the author, who must be accorded
high credibility, 27 justice if we see ˇ Sāpūr’s claims as they are presented in
Ammianus as mere ‘literary reminiscences’. 28 Most scholars agree that in
Roman eyes ˇ Sāpūr’s references to the borders of the former Achaemenid
Empire were a delicate and dangerous political threat. 29
As Roman–Persian relations progressed in time, there are but few hints
that show the East adopting Achaemenid ideology. 30 Be that as it may, in
spite of numerous setbacks, the dynamics of the Sasanian Western policies
from the third to the seventh century illustrate a desire to restore the
Achaemenid borders (15).
This interpretation should not lead us to assume that the Sasanians
were necessarily the aggressors and responsible for every war they fought
with the Romans. In many instances, the activities of the latter were far
from ‘reactive’ or ‘defensive’. On the contrary, there is no doubt that Rome
repeatedly pursued an offensive policy in the East. However, it seems justified
to talk about a programmatic Sasanian foreign policy, which formed
the counterpart to the Roman claim to world domination. 31 Scholars
correctly point to these rivalling ideological claims to explain how Rome and
25 Amm. xvii.5.3–8. 26 Ibid. xxv.4.24.
27 Cf. the important works by Matthews 1989a and Barnes 1998; with regard to the situation in the
East see Matthews 1986: 549–64; on the Sasanians as Rome’s main opponent in the East see Straub
1986: 218–22.
28 Kettenhofen 1984: 183–4 and 190; Seager 1997: 253–68; Teitler 1999: 216–23; Trombley 1999: 17–28.
29 See Rubin 1960: 252 (‘ein Politicum von gefährlicher Brisanz’); for a different interpretation see
Strobel 1993: 288.
30 Yarshater 1971: 517–31.
31 This interpretation is controversial among scholars; see Kettenhofen 1984: 177–90; Wiesehöfer 1986b:
177–85; Winter 1988: 26–44; Panitscheck 1990: 457–72; Potter 1990: 370–80; Gnoli 1991: 57–63;
Wolski 1992: 169–87; Lee 1993a: 21–32; Fowden 1993: 24–36; Wiesehöfer 1994: 389–97, esp. 392;
Kettenhofen 1994a: 99–108; Roaf 1998: 1–7; Daryaree 2002: 1–14; Shahbazi 2002c: 61–73; Huyse
2002: 298–311.