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Beate Dignas & Engelbert Winter - Kaveh Farrokh

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18 The peace treaty of 363 133<br />

On first sight the regulation regarding the so called ‘provinces beyond<br />

the Tigris’ is ambiguous. According to Ammianus Marcellinus ˇ Sāpūr II<br />

obstinately demanded (petebat obstinatius) the return of the territories that<br />

had been ceded to the Romans in 298 but was not given all of these:<br />

apparently Sophanēnē and Ingilēnē remained under Roman influence. 75<br />

Although the author states that Jovian instantly complied with all demands<br />

it would appear that ˇ Sāpūr II eventually was prepared for concessions in<br />

363. After Jovian’s death the Sasanians pursued an aggressive policy against<br />

Armenia, which suggests that ˇ Sāpūr II used the first opportunity to achieve<br />

with arms what he had not accomplished in 363 (26). The two sides failed<br />

in their attempt to come to an understanding with regard to the status of<br />

the traditional ‘bone of contention’ Armenia; the stipulation that Armenia<br />

henceforth was not to receive Western support did not bring about a long<br />

term solution to the problem. 76 ˇ Sāpūr II adhered to what was spelled out in<br />

the treaty of 363 only as long as Jovian was alive. With the emperor’s death<br />

Persian attempts to conquer Armenia began and before the end of ˇ Sāpūr<br />

II’s reign an agreement was reached between the two great powers that<br />

envisaged the actual partition of Armenia. Shortly after, this was confirmed<br />

by a formal agreement. 77<br />

Our sources do not explicitly mention that the foedus of 363 targeted<br />

economic considerations or those relating to trade. However, the negotiations<br />

regarding the Mesopotamian centres of trade and the influence<br />

in Armenia have to be viewed in such a context. 78 The clause that stipulated<br />

the surrender of Nisibis ‘eliminated the Roman monopoly of the<br />

income from the trans-borderia Nisibis’. 79 From the Syriac chronicle of<br />

Joshua the Stylite, 80 which was composed in Edessa at the beginning of the<br />

sixth century, we learn that the Sasanian king Balāˇs (484–8) approached<br />

the Roman emperor Zeno asking him for financial support for his war<br />

against the Hephthalites. Complaining that the taxes of Nisibis granted to<br />

Persia many years before were high enough, 81 the emperor refused to<br />

pay any money to Balāˇs although his predecessor Perōz (459–84) had<br />

received such payments. 82 According to Joshua the Stylite it was agreed<br />

in 363 that the Persians would take possession of Nisibis for 120 years<br />

75 Chrysos 1976: 24; see the commentary by Paschoud 1971–89: 216–20 on Zos. iii.31 and Chrysos 1993:<br />

174–7.<br />

76 On the ‘Armenia clause’ of the treaty of 363 see Chrysos 1976: 32–6; Blockley 1984: 36; 1987: 223–6<br />

and Seager 1996: 275–874.<br />

77 Cf. p. 185 n. 56. 78 <strong>Winter</strong> 1987: 58–62. 79 Blockley 1984: 36.<br />

80 See 26, esp. pp. 186–7. 81 Ios. Styl. 18. 82 Ibid. 9.

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