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Beate Dignas & Engelbert Winter - Kaveh Farrokh

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192 6 Shared interests: Continuing conflicts<br />

and political role the Caucasus region played between the two great powers.<br />

Three aspects are crucial: first the dangers posed by invasions of the<br />

‘barbarians’, secondly the fact that by themselves neither Rome nor the<br />

Persian Empire were able to guard the Caucasus region and thus to protect<br />

their own territory and, thirdly, the necessity to make arrangements for the<br />

protection of the frontier together, to guarantee this by official agreements<br />

and in particular to assign and agree on the financial contributions of each<br />

side.<br />

In this context the ancient author also refers to the peace treaty of the year<br />

363 (18). He confirms once more the loss of important strategic positions<br />

that Jovian had to accept after Julian’s catastrophic defeat in his Persian<br />

War (8). As after 363 87 the Romans withdrew from the Caucasus extremely<br />

slowly, the Persians thought that they had to increase their efforts to protect<br />

the region. John the Lydian seems to indicate that the Romans henceforth<br />

no longer met their financial obligations with regard to the Caucasus. 88 In<br />

the end the Persians could not accept the fact that the Roman payments<br />

had ceased and they decided to invade Syria and Cappadocia. 89 It is also<br />

significant that the author refers to negotiations regarding the costs for<br />

building a fortress in order to protect the portae Caucasiae and for setting<br />

up a garrison. However, it would appear that it did not come to an official<br />

agreement.<br />

In spite of the hostile atmosphere between Rome and Persia, both shared<br />

an interest in fending off bellicose nomadic tribes. However, an agreement<br />

to that effect would have had to be based on an alliance that most probably<br />

did not form until the beginning of the fifth century, and not, as John the<br />

Lydian claims, as early as 363. 90 Certainly from the end of the fourth century<br />

and with the increasing frequency of the attacks by the Huns, which posed<br />

a serious threat to the West and the East, the protection of the Caucasian<br />

passes became a crucial issue for both great powers. 91 This was still the<br />

case when in the following period Rome had to turn to the more and more<br />

pressing problems along the frontiers along the Rhine and the Danube and<br />

the Sasanians alone often had to bear the financial burden of protecting<br />

the Caucasus region. As a consequence the relations tended to deteriorate<br />

and the outbreak of the wars of 421–2 and 441 (19) was directly linked to<br />

87 The confrontations between Valens and Sāpūr ˇ II in Ibēria between 362 and 378 (Amm. xxvii.12.1–2<br />

and xxvii.30.2–3) reveal that the great powers continued to fight over the country; cf. also Chrysos<br />

1993: 183.<br />

88 Luther 1997: 105–6. 89 Lyd. Mag. iii.53.<br />

90 Synelli 1986: 106–20. 91 Chrysos 1993: 183.

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