Beate Dignas & Engelbert Winter - Kaveh Farrokh

8 Julian’s Persian War 91
Ammianus Marcellinus xxiv.7.1 and 3–6
(1) The emperor therefore discussed a siege of Ktēsiphōn with his chief advisors
and then followed the opinion of some well-informed men that this would be bold
and inappropriate because not only was the city impregnable by its location but
also because the king was expected to arrive any minute together with an enormous
force . . .
(3) But as usual he was greedy for more and did not respect the words of those
who warned him; he accused the generals of advising him to let go of the Persian
kingdom, which was already almost won, because of laziness and a desire for leisure.
With the river on his left and untrustworthy guides leading the way he decided
to march quickly into the interior. (4) And as if the fire had been lit with the fatal
torch of Bellona 81 herself, he gave the instruction to burn all ships except for twelve
smaller ones, which he decided would be useful for building bridges and therefore
decided to transport on wagons. He thought that this decision had the advantage of
not leaving a fleet behind for the enemy’s use and in any case the advantage that (as
it had been the case from the beginning of the campaign) almost 20,000 men would
no longer be busy transporting and guiding those ships. 82 (5) When then everybody
muttered, fearing for his life, and open truth revealed that the army, should it be
forced to retreat because the climate was so dry and the mountains so high, would
not be able to return to the waters, and when the defectors openly confessed under
torture that they had told lies, the order was given to exert all energies to extinguish
the flames. As the uncontrollable fire had already spread and had destroyed the
majority of the ships, only the twelve ships, which had been set aside to be kept,
could be saved unharmed. (6) In this way the fleet had been lost although there had
been no need for this, but Julian, who trusted in his ‘unified’ army, because none
of the soldiers were distracted by other duties, advanced with greater numbers into
the interior, where the rich countryside furnished supplies in abundance.
Zosimus iii.28.3–29.1
(3) They [the Romans] passed a few villages and then arrived at Toummara, where
they were all overcome by regret regarding the burnt ships. For the pack-animals,
who had suffered hardship on the long journey through enemy territory, did not
suffice for the provision of necessary supplies and the Persians had collected as
much grain as they could and had hidden this away in the most fortified places
so that they could prevent the Roman army from using it. Although they were
in this situation, the Romans, when Persian units appeared and they fought a
battle, defeated them easily and many Persians died. (4) In the late morning of
the following day, however, the Persians unexpectedly attacked the rear guard of
81 Bellona is the wild and cruel goddess of war, who in later times was often identified with the
Cappadocian goddess Mâ; cf. Amm. xxxi.13.1 where the goddess intervenes when the Romans are
defeated by the Goths at Adrianople (ad 378).
82 The Byzantine historian Zonaras (xxxi.13) claims that two defectors persuaded Julian to burn the
Roman fleet; Lib. Or. 18.263 and Zos. iii.26.4 also mention the small number of the remaining ships.