Beate Dignas & Engelbert Winter - Kaveh Farrokh

120 4 The diplomatic solutions
Saporis the Roman emperor approached the Sasanian king on Persian territory
1 in order to negotiate a peace. ˇ Sāpūr tells us that he consented to
the foedus under the condition that a high ransom was paid for the release
of the Roman prisoners. The sum of 500,000 denarii 2 mentioned in the
inscription suggests a large number and high rank of these prisoners. 3 Not
surprisingly, the Western sources do not include any details regarding the
ransom. 4 They emphasise the territorial agreements, 5 which ˇ Sāpūr himself
also alludes to by remarking that the Roman emperor became tributary to
the Sasanian king. His words hint at the political situation in Armenia. 6
Whereas up to this point Rome had made payments to Armenia for maintaining
the fortresses in the Caucasus against nomadic invasions, ˇ Sāpūr I
now became the recipient of these payments and thus took over the responsibility
for the protection of Armenia against the threat from the north; both
powers were equally interested in this task (27). As can be expected from
this propagandistic source, the ˇ Sāpūr Inscription emphasises the Roman
emperor’s retreat 7 and the new influential position of the Sasanian ruler in
Armenia. 8 What should rather be described as ‘Rome’s annual subsidiary
payments for the fortresses in the Caucasus’ ˇ Sāpūr labels as ‘tributary payments’.
However, there is no doubt that the agreement on the Armenian
question shifted the balance of power in ˇ Sāpūr’s favour. The majority of
the Western sources judge the foedus of 244 as a failure and talk about a
‘most dishonourable peace’. 9
Philip the Arab tried to present the treaty as a success. Coins issued in the
year 244 praise the pax fundata cum Persis (fig. 16). 10 Inscriptions dated to the
years 244 and 245 name Philip the Arab as Persicus maximus or Parthicus
maximus and thus refer to the emperor’s triumph over the Sasanians. 11
1 Winter 1994: 599–602 discusses the venue for the peace negotiations.
2 These must have been gold denarii; cf. Guey 1961: 261–75 and Pekáry 1961: 275–83; regarding the
character of this payment see Winter 1988: 101–2.
3 Sprengling 1953: 84.
4 Zos. iii.32.4, who describes the peace as detrimental for Rome, must have been aware of the high
ransom for Roman prisoners, which may well have had an impact on his evaluation.
5 Zon. xii.19 talks about the loss of Mesopotamia; Zos. i.19.1 does not mention the loss of any territory.
The author explicitly states (iii.32.4) that the year 244 had not seen any loss of Roman territory;
according to Euagr. HE V.7 Rome had to cede territory in Armenia.
6 On the cession of territories see Winter 1988: 102–7 and Bleckmann 1992: 76–88.
7 Kettenhofen 1982: 35 n. 72 raises the possibility that the agreement as far as Armenia was concerned
featured a kind of ‘non-intervention-clause’.
8 On the Roman–Sasanian battle over Armenia in the third century in general see Chaumont 1969
and 1976.
9 Zos. iii.32.4. 10 Cf. Baldus 1971: 31.
11 CIL iii 4346; 10619 (= ILS 507); 14354/6; vi 1097 (= ILS 506).