Beate Dignas & Engelbert Winter - Kaveh Farrokh

20 The peace treaty of 562 147
defectors to return without punishment. The treaty explicitly mentions,
however, that this applied only to persons who had left their country during
the war and not to future defectors so that these would not jeopardise
home security by passing on information. The long period of war had
seen many cases of unrest and raids among the population of the border
regions concerned. The controversies between individuals and above all the
conflicts between the border cities were to be investigated. According to
articles seven and eleven the authorities in charge of the border areas were
instructed to mediate in these cases and those responsible forced to pay
damages. If an agreement could not be reached the matter was entrusted to
higher authorities, which had to come to a decision by a fixed deadline. 141
If the matter had not been settled at the final stage of appeal, which was
the appeal to the ruler, this amounted to a breach of the treaty.
Last but not least, the two parties included a ‘religious guarantee clause’ in
order to make sure that the agreed terms would be observed and effective. If
Menander the Guardsman uses the authentic words by which the peace was
entrusted to divine protection, the treaty displays extremely careful wording
also in this respect; the clause compelled both a Christian Byzantium and a
Zoroastrian Persia to respect the agreement. The author makes no reference,
however, to either hostages of high rank, who would customarily have been
part of an official treaty of this type, 142 or to an oath sworn by each ruler.
Conclusion
Who was the ‘victor’ of the foedus of 562 after all? On the one hand, Justinian
cannot have been happy with the stipulated large payments, which showed
the character of tributary payments and were bound to ruin his prestige.
On the other hand, he could claim as a success that the important fortress of
Dārā was retained, that the Romans were freed from the financial burdens
to do with the protection of the Caucasus passes and that the Sasanians were
withdrawing from the territory of Lazika. From a Sasanian perspective it was
a considerable loss to give up this strategically and economically important
Black Sea region.
Beyond throwing light on the question of how the balance of power
was shifted the foedus and the actual treaty as transmitted by the Byzantine
historian Menander the Guardsman serve as an excellent testimony
to the intense diplomatic contacts and the high level of international relations
between Byzantium and the Persian Empire in the sixth century. 143
A survey of the individual points addressed in the treaty indicates that all
141 Ziegler 1972: 427–42. 142 Lee 1991: 366–74. 143 Verosta 1965: 153–6.