Beate Dignas & Engelbert Winter - Kaveh Farrokh

1 To the beginning of the third century 15
In spite of Trajan’s great military successes, his Parthian War (114–17)
ended with a fiasco. 36 Late in Trajan’s reign revolts took place in the conquered
territories, and the new provinces of Armenia, Mesopotamia and
Assyria were eventually lost. Trajan’s successor Hadrian (117–38) returned to
the Augustan policy of ‘sustaining the empire within its borders’ (coercendi
intra terminos) 37 and restored the amicitia with the Parthian kingdom on
the basis of the status quo that had existed before the war. 38 In its outline,
this policy was not even changed by the successful Parthian Wars of L. Verus
(161–9) and Septimius Severus (193–211), who – after Trajan’s offensive –
advanced a second and third time as far as the Parthian capital Seleucia-
Ktēsiphōn. 39 Rome withdrew after these successes. Its declared goals were
different from those of the beginning of the second century and no longer
extended to the subjugation of the Parthian kingdom. But whereas the Eastern
power had retained its political sovereignty, Rome’s military successes
improved its strategic position along the Eastern frontier considerably, in
particular by moving the frontiers forward to the Chaboras-Singara line,
which created a boundary within Mesopotamia, and finally establishing the
province of Mesopotamia during the reign of Septimius Severus. 40 Roman
control over upper Mesopotamia represented a permanent and immediate
threat to the Mesopotamian heartland of the Parthian kingdom. This
was the end of a policy that firmly recognised the Euphrates as the border
between Romans and Parthians.
At the beginning of the third century ad Caracalla (211–17) launched yet
another attack against the Parthians. 41 In contrast to his predecessors, he
seems to have pursued the conquest of the Parthian kingdom. Apparently,
his plans amounted to world domination and were guided by the idea that
he would become a successor of Alexander the Great – he was certainly
not prepared to acknowledge Parthian sovereignty. Caracalla’s attempts to
create a casus belli for a ‘justified war’ illustrate this position no less than
his actions during the Parthian campaign when he desecrated the graves
of local rulers in the Adiabēnē. 42 In contrast, ancient authors mention
Caracalla’s plans to marry the daughter of the Parthian king Artabanos IV.
36 Lepper 1948; Eadie 1985: 407–23; Lightfoot 1990: 115–26; Wylie 1990: 37–43.
37 See note 21 above.
38 Birley 1956: 25–33 and Birley 1998: 66–76.
39 Birley 1987: 140–7; 1988: 201–4; Rubin 1975: 419–41; Speidel 1985: 321–6; Potter 1991: 277–90; Millar
1996: 80–99 and 111–26.
40 On the fortification of the Roman Eastern frontier along the Tigris and Chaboras under the Severan
emperors see Kennedy 1987: 57–66; Wagner 1985: 63–7; 1983: 103–30; Millar 1996: 127–41.
41 Heichelheim 1944: 113–15. 42 Cass. Dio lxxix.1.1–2.