Beate Dignas & Engelbert Winter - Kaveh Farrokh

128 4 The diplomatic solutions
Trans-Tigritania. He must have hoped that such a policy of integration
would secure the loyalty of the Armenians. 43 In this way, Rome pushed
forward the line of defence for the province of Mesopotamia. During the
following years, however, we observe new Roman activities with an eye to
securing the border region, which illustrate the strategic importance of the
area for the West. 44 Another territorial clause poses problems. 45 According
to Peter the Patrician the fortress of Zintha, which was supposed to mark the
boundary of Armenia, was situated along the border to Mēdia. If we trust
the words of the Byzantine historian, the borders of Armenia would have
been shifted considerably eastward. In this case, Armenia would have been
compensated for the loss of the ‘provinces beyond the Tigris’ in the area of
the Media Atropatēnē (Azerbaijan) at Sasanian expense. It is also possible,
however, that the fortress was situated within the border region Ingilēnē,
which, as already mentioned, was ceded to Rome and was explicitly named
in the treaty because of its strategic importance.
Moreover, any compensation for Armenia by way of a south-eastern
extension of its borders is problematic. 46 The overall policy of the Roman
emperor speaks against an eastward extension of the borders all the way into
the area of the Media Atropatēnē. Diocletian’s conservative policy rather
aimed at securing the status quo. It is noteworthy that Tiridates III was
excluded from the peace negotiations of the year 298 although Galerius
owed his military success against Narsē above all to the help of the Armenian
king. Diocletian acted in the name of Tiridates III, who apparently
did not have any choice but to acknowledge his dependence on Rome. It
does not look, therefore, as if Diocletian felt obliged to compensate Tiridates
for anything. The latter must have been well aware that his existence
depended on the great powers, and this was once more revealed by the treaty
of 298. 47
According to Peter the Patrician the peace treaty also demanded that in
the future the king of Ibēria would receive the symbols of his rule from
Rome. Narsē thus had to acknowledge a Roman protectorate of Ibēria,
which was situated south of the middle Caucasus and north of Armenia.
43 Barceló 1981: 159 assumes that the long existing amicitia between Rome and Armenia was confirmed
and that this friendship extended to a wide range of scenarios, such as Rome asking the Arsacid
nobility ruling Armenia to protect Roman interests in the East.
44 Honigmann 1935: 4–5; Enßlin 1942: 54–70 and Lightfoot 1986: 509–29.
45 Winter 1988: 180–6.
46 Kettenhofen 1995c: 69–73.
47 Against this background we have to understand Tiridates III’s decision to make Christianity the
state religion in Armenia soon after 298. The war against Armenia that began in 312 was the answer
to this move, which had such wide-reaching consequences for Armenia’s future; on the war against
Armenia by Maximinus Daia see Castritius 1968/9: 94–103; on Tiridates and the Christianisation of
Armenia see Chaumont 1969: 131–46 and Kettenhofen 1995c: 48–135.