Beate Dignas & Engelbert Winter - Kaveh Farrokh

18 The peace treaty of 363 131
18: The peace treaty of 363 between Jovian and ˇSāpūr II
For the most part, Rome’s territorial gains and corresponding strategic and
economic advantages that resulted from the foedus of 298 were lost when
ˇSāpūr II and Jovian concluded a new peace in 363. 59 This time it was the
Roman emperor who – in light of his crushing military defeat – had to
agree to more or less all conditions for peace named by ˇ Sāpūr II. For Rome,
losing important strategic positions and cities meant considerable loss of
prestige. Many and varied sources ranging from chroniclers and historians
to poets, orators and theologians reveal how Rome struggled with this
situation, both historically and ideologically. 60 We owe the most elaborate
account to the eyewitness Ammianus Marcellinus, who was an officer in
the Roman army at the time and participated in a number of wars during
his lifetime.
Ammianus Marcellinus xxv.7.9–14
(9) But the king insisted on demanding what, as he called it, was his and what
had been taken away a long time ago by Maximianus 61 but really, as the situation
required, for our release 62 five regions beyond the Tigris: Arzanēnē, Moxoēnē, Zabdikēnē
and also Rehimēnē and Karduēnē together with fifteen fortresses, Nisibis
as well as Singara and the Castra Maurorum, 63 a very convenient fortification. (10)
And although it would have been ten times better to fight than to hand over any
of these, the many flatterers put the timid emperor under pressure by bringing
up the dreaded name of Procopius 64 and predicting that if he, after learning of
Julian’s death, returned with a fresh army, which he commanded, he would easily
and without opposition overthrow the government. (11) Without hesitation the
emperor, greatly inflamed by these persistent and dangerous remarks, handed over
everything they asked for 65 and he barely made sure that Nisibis and Singara came
under Persian control without their inhabitants and that the Romans from the
fortresses that were to be handed over were allowed to return to our protection.
59 For an analysis of this foedus of 363 see ibid.: 25–60; Blockley 1984: 34–7 and Chrysos 1993: 165–202.
60 See Chrysos 1993: 166–7; Chrysos lists the testimonies related to the peace treaty.
61 ˇ Sāpūr II has Narsē’s defeat against Gaius Galerius Valerius Maximianus in 298 in mind (6), which
resulted in the peace concluded at Nisibis (17).
62 With these words Ammianus Marcellinus refers to the difficult situation of the Roman army, which
was still situated in the enemy’s territory when Julian died and exposed to the continuing Sasanian
attacks.
63 This important Roman fortification in Mesopotamia, a two days’ march away from Dārā, is mentioned
by the author elsewhere (xviii.6.9) and also by Procopius (Aed. ii.4); see Ball 1989: 7–18 and
2003: 80–1.
64 This is the usurper Procopius, a relative of the emperor Julian, who had been a general in his Persian
campaign and on whom Julian was said to have conferred the imperial title; on 28 September 365
he had himself proclaimed emperor in Constantinople but in May of the following year he was
defeated by the emperor Valens.
65 Eutropius (x.17.3) and Festus (29) also claim that Jovian showed more concern for the preservation
of his rule than for the interests of the empire.