Beate Dignas & Engelbert Winter - Kaveh Farrokh

26 Armenia 187
Edessa and the surrounding area at the beginning of the sixth century
as well as the history of the Sasanian Empire during the reigns of Pērōz,
Balāˇs, Kavādh I and ˇ Gāmāsp. 61 The passage throws light on the inner
affairs of Greater Armenia, 62 which were closely linked to the increasingly
complex and difficult foreign policy of the Sasanian Empire. Here, the
growing threat in the East by the Hephthalites affected internal affairs. The
‘crisis’ reached a first peak when in the summer of 484 the Hephthalites
defeated the Persians and killed King Pērōz (459–84). The situation was
exacerbated by severe financial problems. According to Joshua the Stylite
the two successors of Pērōz, Balāˇs (484–8) and Kavādh I (488–97/499–
531) were forced to approach the Western opponent and ask for gold from
the imperial treasury. Kavādh’s aggressive tone was unmistakable – the
king threatened Byzantium with war should his request be turned down. 63
Nevertheless, both Zeno and his successor Anastasius refused the desired
financial support.
Unrest in Armenia was thus also an expression of the internal problems
of the Sasanian Empire at the beginning of the rule of Kavādh I, which led
to confrontations with various peoples along the borders of the empire. 64
Joshua the Stylite specifically points to the Armenian unwillingness to
accept Persian attempts to convert them to the Zoroastrian faith. 65 The
destructions of the fire temples – symbols of Persian rule – and the assassination
of numerous Magians by Armenians triggered war. Initial Sasanian
attempts to consolidate their rule by military action were unsuccessful.
It is not a coincidence that the upheavals in Armenia were accompanied
by the Armenians’ desire to establish diplomatic contacts with Byzantium
and to procure Roman protection, a scenario that once more illustrates
Armenia’s delicate role between the two great powers. Ultimately, if there
was such ‘conscious’ reasoning, Armenia could only ‘survive’ through an
alliance with either of the two opponents. Anastasius, however, refused any
help for Armenia because from a Persian perspective this could have been
viewed as an intervention in Sasanian affairs and thus a valid reason for war.
The emperor’s decision reflects an attitude that applies to the fifth century
as a whole, namely for Byzantium to hold back along the Eastern frontier
of the empire rather than to risk any aggressive behaviour towards the
Eastern opponent. Armenia was thus left to its own devices. The Armenians’
attempt to ally themselves with Rome had also been motivated by religion
61 Cf. Luther 1997: 1–4. 62 For the general background see Thomson 2000: 662–77.
63 Ios. Styl. 18 and 19. 64 Luther 1997: 145.
65 On the rigorous Sasanian religious policy in Armenia under Yazdgard II and Pērōz see Chaumont
1987a: 429–30.