Beate Dignas & Engelbert Winter - Kaveh Farrokh

1 To the beginning of the third century 17
history of Iran as a whole has gained significance – in particular with
regard to the study of the Achaemenids and the Sasanians. Relations with
Rome were in fact a major structural element in the history of the Parthian
kingdom. Wolski is right in emphasising that the ‘Iranicism’ of the Arsacids
played an important role in their conflict with Rome. The recollection of
the significant Achaemenid past 50 encouraged the Arsacids to stand up to
the Roman Empire, an aspect that widens the scope of Arsacid policies
tremendously. 51 A prime example is the following: according to the Roman
historian Tacitus, the Parthian king Artabanos II (10/11–38) threatened
the Roman emperor Tiberius (14–37) by referring to the old Persian and
Macedonian conquests and by boasting that he would gain possession of
what Cyrus and later Alexander had ruled. 52 By comparing the first Arsacid
ruler with the first Achaemenid ruler Cyrus (559–530 bc) the third-century
author Justin also underlines this claim. 53 The Parthians thus continued
Achaemenid traditions and can be counted among the ‘first pioneers of
Iranicism’. 54
K. H. Ziegler hesitates to label Arsacid foreign policy ‘programmatic’ 55
because there was no Arsacid ideology equivalent to the Roman idea of
world domination. He argues that Parthian goals never amounted to the
destruction of the Roman Empire and that even the claims made by Artabanos
II in Tacitus’ account aimed at territorial gains that were modest in
comparison with later Sasanian claims. 56 It is crucial for an assessment of
Roman–Sasanian relations to examine whether the Sasanians took up goals
of the Arsacid rulers and continued their Western policy or developed plans
that went beyond any foreign policy pursued by the Parthians. Given that
the late phase of Parthian–Roman relations was characterised by mutual
respect and appreciation – certainly beyond a modus vivendi 57 and with
options for a formalised relationship on the basis of an international law, 58
one also has to ask if and to what extent the rising Sasanian Empire was
prepared to use the opportunity and to further develop existing relations.
50 Metzler 1982: 130–7.
51 On the goals of Arsacid foreign policy and on Arsacid military strength see Kennedy 1996a: 67–90.
52 Tac. Ann. vi.37. Cf. Wiesehöfer 1986b: 177–85; Ehrhardt 1998: 299 with further references.
53 Iust. xli.5.5. 54 Wolski 1983b: 147. 55 Dabrowa 1984: 153.
56 Ziegler 1964: 86; cf. also Zyromski 1998: 11.
57 Wirth 1980/1: 324. 58 Ziegler 1964: 140.