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Beate Dignas & Engelbert Winter - Kaveh Farrokh

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14 1 To the beginning of the third century<br />

ideological level, however, Rome’s claim for world domination remained<br />

intact. 26 Many comments made by poets of the Augustan period, who represented<br />

the opinion of the nobility in the city of Rome, reflect the view<br />

that no state or people could be equal to the imperium Romanum. 27<br />

Augustus initiated a policy that refrained from conquests beyond the<br />

Euphrates and acknowledged the Parthians as a second world power equal<br />

to Rome. Although Nero (54–68) fought a Parthian War over Armenia,<br />

the Arsacid ruler Tiridates was eventually crowned by Nero as king of<br />

Armenia in a great Roman spectacle, 28 and we may say that Augustus’<br />

policy of cooperation laid the foundation for a more or less uninterrupted<br />

peace between the two powers throughout the first century ad. The fact<br />

that in ad 66 the so-called ‘Armenian question’ found a solution must<br />

have strengthened relations even further (26). 29 Local conflicts, Rome’s<br />

fortification of the frontier along the Euphrates and in the Caucasus and a<br />

tightened Roman rule in the Eastern provinces did their part to see relations<br />

deteriorate but did not immediately lead to new armed confrontations on<br />

the Eastern frontier of the Roman Empire. 30 Rome, however, improved its<br />

military position significantly during this period. 31<br />

At the beginning of the second century the emperor Trajan (98–117)<br />

intended to conquer the Parthian kingdom and thereby turned the dream<br />

of Roman world domination into political reality. 32 Our ancient sources do<br />

not reveal the precise reasons for the emperor’s Parthian campaign. It looks<br />

as if ideas of world domination and military glory 33 were equally important<br />

as strategic considerations regarding a stronger Roman frontier beyond the<br />

Euphrates. Trajan rejected Parthian efforts to come to a peaceful settlement.<br />

Contemporary observers criticised the emperor’s actions prior to the<br />

military confrontations 34 and accused him of turning his back on a Roman<br />

policy in the East that had prevailed since Augustus, namely a policy that<br />

acknowledged the sovereignty of the Parthian kingdom as a political factor<br />

within a community of states that abided by the same international laws. 35<br />

26 On the image of the Parthians in the West see Sonnabend 1986.<br />

27 For references see Wissemann 1982.<br />

28 Anderson 1934: 743–80; Ziegler 1964: 67–78; Wagner 1985: 31–42.<br />

29 Wolski 1983a: 269–77; for the period after 34/5 see also Schottky 1991: 81–7; for the position of<br />

Armenia between the two great powers in general see Garsoïan 1997a: 63–94 and 1985: 95–116.<br />

30 For developments within the Parthian kingdom during the first century see Dabrowa 1981: 187–204;<br />

Schottky 1991: 61–135; Ash 1999: 114–35.<br />

31 For the fortification of the Roman–Parthian frontier along the Euphrates from Augustus to the<br />

Flavian emperors see Dabrowa 1980: 382–8; Wagner 1985: 19–57; Bosworth 1976: 63–78; Mitchell<br />

1993: 118–42.<br />

32 On Trajan’s political goals see Eadie 1985: 407–23.<br />

33 Cf. esp. Cass. Dio lxviii.17.1. 34 E.g. Front. 15. 35 Cf. Ziegler 1964: 102.

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