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Beate Dignas & Engelbert Winter - Kaveh Farrokh

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134 4 The diplomatic solutions<br />

but that the city would then be returned to its previous masters. 83 This<br />

phase ended while Zeno was emperor. When the Sasanians refused to<br />

hand over the city new disputes arose. The financial loss incurred by<br />

the outstanding taxes remained an issue of contention and were at least<br />

in part responsible for the attitude of the Byzantine emperor Zeno<br />

(474–75/476–91).<br />

The so called ‘Romance of Julian’, written by a monk from Edessa and<br />

generally dubious as a historical source, contains an interesting remark in<br />

this context. 84 The anonymous author states that Jovian agreed to hand<br />

over Nisibis for 100 years and that during this period no Christians were<br />

persecuted in the Sasanian Empire. 85 The two Syriac sources agree that the<br />

clauses of 363 were limited to a fixed period of time. According to Ammianus<br />

Marcellinus the peace was concluded for thirty years. 86 It is possible that<br />

this was intended to be a time span of ‘one generation’ and the expected<br />

lifetime of the Roman emperor Jovian, who in 363 was thirty years old; he<br />

adhered to the terms of the treaty until his death. The discussions regarding<br />

the foedus of 363 that arose during the fifth century illustrate that the time<br />

limit was not simply a diplomatic formula but that it was a real aspect of<br />

the treaty which could indeed cause problems later. 87<br />

In any case, the time limit assigned a somewhat provisional character<br />

to the treaty that had been concluded between Jovian and ˇ Sāpūr II. Its<br />

clauses were not necessarily interpreted as binding and definitive. Given<br />

the territorial losses that Rome suffered, this must undoubtedly be regarded<br />

as a success for Jovian. It would not appear to be justified, and not even<br />

in light of the ceding of Roman territories, to talk about a ‘shameful and<br />

humiliating peace’ for Rome. 88 Although Ammianus Marcellinus tries hard<br />

to criticise the Roman emperor for his wrong behaviour in the year 363, he<br />

does not fail to notice that during the peace negotiations Jovian was above<br />

all interested in securing the release of his troops (pro redemptione nostra).<br />

After Julian’s military catastrophe (8) it must indeed have been Jovian’s<br />

primary goal to see his army withdraw unharmed by Sasanian attacks. 89<br />

He was able to achieve this goal by obligating Rome in the way discussed<br />

above.<br />

83 Ibid. 7; on the questionable historical accuracy of this passage see Luther 1997: 99–101.<br />

84 Luther 1997: 100.<br />

85 Nöldeke 1874: 285; see also ibid.: 284–92 for a detailed summary of the content and critical commentary<br />

(on the basis of Hoffmann 1880 and Wright 1872: no. 918); see also Drijvers 1994: 201–14.<br />

86 Zos. iii.31.1 also mentions a peace of thirty years.<br />

87 Chrysos 1993: 186. 88 Agath. iv.26.7. 89 Cf. Ehling 1996: 186–91.

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