Beate Dignas & Engelbert Winter - Kaveh Farrokh

4 Earliest Roman–Sasanian confrontations 75
The description of the Persian War of Severus Alexander and the obvious
idealisation of the emperor illustrate how problematic these biographies are
as a historical source.
Scriptores Historiae Augustae, Severus Alexander 56.2 and 5–8
(2) From the senatorial records of the seventh day before the Calends of
October: 16 Senators, we have defeated the Persians. There is no need for long
explanations, you should learn only this much, how they were armed and what
their contingents were. . .
(5) We scattered 120,000 of their cavalry, we killed 10,000 mailed horsemen, 17
whom they call Clibanarians, 18 in battle and equipped our men with their armour.
We captured many Persians and then sold them into slavery. (6) We re-conquered
the area between the streams, namely Mesopotamia, which had been given up
by that vile beast. 19 (7) We put Ardaˇsīr (I), the most powerful king (not only by
name but also in fact) to flight once and for all so that he was seen in flight even
on Persian territory, and the king escaped to where our standards had once been
taken, 20 leaving his own standards behind. (8) These, Senators, are the facts. There
is no need for further explanations. Our soldiers are returning as wealthy men, in
light of the victory nobody feels the fatigue.
Scriptores Historiae Augustae, Severus Alexander 57.2–3
(2) This we found in both the annals and many authors. Some, however, claim that
he was betrayed by his slave and that he did not defeat the king but fled himself so
that he would not be defeated. (3) For those who know the testimonies well there
is no doubt that this is against the prevailing view. This minority even claims that
he lost his army through hunger, cold and disease, as Herodian states against the
prevailing view.
In a fictive speech, the emperor boasts of his military achievements, which
present him as the glorious victor over the Persians. The emperor’s skills in
warfare and his successes are central to the passage. Although the author
knows Herodian’s account and explicitly names the author, he does not rely
on his work and doubts his credibility because Herodian’s remarks would
spoil the image of the princeps bonus.
16 This is a fictive document dating from 25 September 233, which the author of the vita claims to cite.
17 There is no doubt that this number is exaggerated; the origins of these catafractarii go back to the
sixth century bc. These were heavily armed cavalry from the areas around the Aral Sea who had been
integrated into the Seleucid army. Since the time of Hadrian the mailed horsemen also appear in
the Roman army; for a description of their elaborate suit of armour see Amm. xvi.10.8 and xxv.1.12;
on Persian armour and fighting in general see Wilcox and McBride 1986 and 3 above; on the two
powers’ military and strategies see Coulston 1986: 77–91; Frye 1977: 7–15.
18 For equating catafractarii and clibanarii see Amm. xvi.10.8 and Veg. Mil. iii.24; whereas the clibanarii
were soldiers whose horses also wore mailed armour, the horses of the Roman catafractarii were not
mailed; see 3 above, on Sasanian armament and tactics.
19 This is a reference to the Roman emperor Elagabalus (218–22).
20 In 54/53 BC the Roman standards were lost when Crassus was defeated at Carrhae; cf. p. 12 n. 13.