Beate Dignas & Engelbert Winter - Kaveh Farrokh

130 4 The diplomatic solutions
Most modern scholars interpret the foedus of 298 as a great political and
diplomatic Roman triumph. In contrast, P. Barceló and R. Klein argue
that the final treaty of the year 298 created a situation that was genuinely
unacceptable for the Sasanians and hence dangerous. The two scholars
talk about a delayed war rather than a real peace, which only lasted as
long as it did because for a while the Sasanian king ˇ Sāpūr II was preoccupied
with domestic and other foreign affairs. They claim that Diocletian’s
wish to fortify the border revealed how much the emperor was aware of
the danger. 55 According to G. Wirth Rome dictated peace conditions that
the Sasanian Empire perceived as threatening its very existence. 56 However,
such interpretations fail to see the defensive character of Diocletian’s
policy.
Moreover, we have to look at Sasanian interests from the perspective of
the year 298 and not in light of the following events. Considering Narsē’s
military defeat, what could he have expected from a peace treaty with Rome,
in particular given the fact that his family was held captive by the enemy? His
goal for the negotiations was the release of the royal prisoners, and in return
he seems to have been prepared to accept any reasonable terms. Diocletian’s
demands must therefore be regarded as moderate and restrained. Only if
the emperor had acted differently by claiming more Persian territory or had
even refused to release the prisoners – which, considering Valerian’s death in
Sasanian captivity not long before, might have been considered an option –
could one indeed talk of repressions and a treaty that bore the seeds for a new
war. As it was, Narsē achieved his main goal in the negotiations, the return
of the captives, and from a Sasanian perspective this was a success as much
as the fact that Rome waived territorial claims. Narsē certainly accepted
terms that entailed significant strategic and economic disadvantages for the
Sasanian Empire but in view of the situation in the year 298 this had been
inevitable.
An analysis of the peace treaty of 298 57 should also point to the fact that in
spite of the military and diplomatic defeat the dignified role of the Persian
king and the equality between the ‘King of kings’ and the emperor were
respected. Rome acknowledged the sovereignty of the defeated Sasanian
ruler. 58 Likewise, in light of his defeat Narsē gave up Sasanian plans for a
world empire. Towards the end of the third century each of the two powers
therefore respected the might of the opponent both on a military and a
diplomatic level.
55 Klein 1977: 185 and Barceló 1981: 74. 56 Wirth 1980/1: 336–7.
57 Winter 1988: 208–15. 58 Ziegler 1964: 145 and Chrysos 1976: 1–60.