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functions. An increasing body of evidence shows that when accidents or disease have destroyeda potion of the prefrontal cortex, individuals may be left with drastically modified personalitiesand an inability to control impulsive, destructive behaviors. There is growing enthusiasm amongsome defense attorneys and neuroscientists for the use of magnetic resonance imaging in thecourtroom, as brain scans can demonstrate diminished culpability in cases where defendants areaccused of violent crimes such as sexual offenses. This paper looks at the rhetorical implicationsof using brain scans in sex offender trials, taking the standpoint that “brain imaging is more thana scientific research agenda – it is a persuasive visual rhetoric by which neuroscience isarticulated as relevant to the construction and maintenance of desirable selves” (Johnson, 2008,p. 148). A brain scan that shows damage to an accused sex offender’s prefrontal cortex canpotentially illustrate a physiological incapacity that contributed to the crime, and speak to thepotential of treatment. Yet just as probable, the image of a damaged brain can underscore theassumption that the offender is monstrous and beyond any hope of rehabilitation. The danger isthat, rather than leading to a new paradigm in which we value treatment as much as punishmentfor some sex offenders, the rhetorical charm of brain scans for lay audiences could instead evenmore powerfully perpetuate the myth of monstrousness.Taking the Heat Out? Prevention and Law’s Response to Sexual Offenders (ACriminologist’s Perspective)Bill Hebenton, Manchester University (Bill.Hebenton@manchester.ac.uk)Politicization and the dominant regulatory response to sexual crime have now givencontemporary conceptions of the sexual offender a durability that their predecessors lacked.Concisely captured by Eric Janus's term “the predator template”, commentators point to thepolitical “untouchability” of law’s response to such collective risk and argue that its variouseffects lie not simply in it being evidence-lite, but in the deeper expressive undertow. Yet, while“evidence-based” or “rationalist” approaches may appeal to technocrats and a number ofacademics, they often fail to compete successfully in the social context where affectiveapproaches to law and order policies resonate with the public and appear to meet deep-seatedpsychological needs. Many now reach for a model of public policymaking where emotions areneither privileged as desirable nor marginalized as basically irrational. However, less attentionhas been given to how these offenses might be prevented from occurring in the first place, andless still has been given to the design and organization of physical and social environments sothat the potential for these offenses to occur might be minimized. This paper examines the extentto which elision from offender to situation betokens a different congeries of the normative,emotional and practical in relation to expertise, public and governmental communication,deliberation and decision-making.98. Law’s Passions II: The Emotions and the Rules of Evidence239