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The ‘social model of disability’ gives substance to the ‘paradigm shift’ which is hailed as thepivotal contribution of the CRPD to the human rights landscape. This paper examines theimplications of the social model of disability for the mental health law. It begins with anexamination of the theoretical and conceptual underpinnings of the social model of disability insociology and critical disability studies. It then considers the manifestation or expression of thesocial model of disability in the CRPD, with reference to the ‘definition of disability on the basisof disability’ and the concept of reasonable accommodation. The paper shows that the adoptionof the social model of disability in the CRPD marks a critical juncture in international humanrights law by recognising in an international covenant the social production of knowledge, thesocial production and reproduction of human rights abuse, and the social determinants of healthand well being. It argues that the social model of disability provides a framework within whichthe entrenched relationships, attitudes and assumptions that underpin traditional forms of socialand legal engagement with people with disabilities, including people with mental illness, may bechallenged. In practical terms this approach destabilizes ‘capacity’ as workable construct inmental health law, augmenting it with a strong preference for the principle of participation.Swedish Mental Health Law Revisited: Discrimination and Values at StakeAnna Nilsson, Lund University (anna.nilsson@jur.lu.se)Moa Kindstrom Dahlin, Stockholm University (moa.kindstrom-dahlin@juridicum.su.se)Should all people with disabilities be decision makers in their own lives, or should the decisionmakingin some cases be left to a third party with the former person’s best interests at heart? Thiswas the core question throughout the negotiations of the Convention on the Rights of Personswith Disabilities (CRPD). Even though this question is answered with ambiguous silence, thatitself is ground-breaking. Previous human rights instruments explicitly legitimized involuntaryinterventions in mental health care and focused on minimizing the use of coercion, providedsafeguards and ensured that compulsory treatment was only applied to those who needed it, i.e.those who are "really mentally ill." The CRPD is different. It contains no provisions explicitlylegitimizing compulsory psychiatric care. Instead references to equality set the limit for nonconsensualinterventions. But what does equality mean in the mental health context? And whatconstitutes legitimate interventions? To answer these questions, we explore differentunderstandings of equality as well as unveiling the values and conflicts of interests in Swedishmental health law. We argue that certain changes are urgently needed in the Swedish context,regardless of which understanding of equality one adopts.Appropriate Types of Involuntary Treatment: Can Human Rights StandardsProvide Greater Guidance?411