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Filippo Santoni de Sio, Delft University of Technology (f.santonidesio@tudelft.nl)In this paper I challenge the view that there is a clear-cut conceptual distinction between aninsanity defence and a plea of unfitness to plead, a view based on the distinction betweeninsanity as a doctrine of substantive law affecting the agent’s responsibility, and unfitness toplead as a doctrine of procedure affecting the legitimacy of trial. What this picture tends toconceal is the fact that responsibility has a diachronic nature, as far as it depends on the abilityon the part of the agent not only to act according to reason, but also to engage in a reflection onhis actions and the reasons for them. If so, a lack of the relevant capacities at the time of the trialmay impinge on the responsibility of the offender, not only on the right to proceed with the trialagainst him. To highlight this point some cases of serious dissociation of personality are takeninto account. These cases are particularly interesting, insofar as they concern agents who didn’tmanifest any serious mental defect at the time of their wrongful action, nor at the time of trial.Still, doubts about these agents’ responsibility arise because of their apparent inability torecognize, at the time of trial, their actions as something that they did, for which they should nowanswer.Sane Enough for Execution (and Other Punishments)Nicole A Vincent, Macquarie University (nicole.vincent@mq.edu.au)What mental capacities should people have to be "sane enough" for punishment, and wouldmental capacities instilled, for example through forced medical treatment with anti-psychoticdrugs, suffice? I will argue that to answer these questions we must consider at least four factors.Firstly, whether we take the aim of punishment to be retribution, deterrence (specific or general),reform, rehabilitation, therapy, incapacitation, communication (to/with the public, to/withcriminals), expression of solidarity (with victims and their families), restoration of the law'sauthority, revenge, etc. Secondly, supposing that we settle on retribution, whether ourinterpretation of what retribution requires is merely that the party should suffer, or that theyshould also understand the state’s reasons for making them suffer, etc. Thirdly, what mode ofpunishment is proposed – e.g. execution, imprisonment, flogging, community service, fines, etc.And fourthly, a range of normative considerations might also come into play – for instance, ifretribution requires understanding of the state’s reasons for infliction of suffering, then whatdegree of understanding is required and why; if plural aims are being pursued (e.g. retributionand deterrence) then what is the relative importance of each aim; and why that particular mode(and degree) of punishment is seen as appropriate.151. Seeking ReformTitle T.B.A.358