Allan Kardec-THE Spirit's Book_ The Principles of Spiritist Doctrine (1989)

145
THE SPIRITS’ BOOK
3. Can the man who has done wrong because the means of enlightenment have been denied to
him be justly punished for wrong-doing which has not been the result of his own choice?
4. We endeavour to enlighten, moralise, and civilise mankind; but, for one whom we are able
to enlighten, there are millions who die every year without the light having reached them.
What is to be the fate of these millions? Are they to be treated as reprobates? and, if they are
not to be so treated, how have they deserved to be placed in the same category with those who
have become enlightened and moralised?
5. What is to be the fate of children who die before they have been able to do either good or
evil? If they are to be received among the supremely happy, why should this favour be
granted to them without their having done anything to deserve it? And in virtue of what
privilege are they exempted from undergoing the tribulations of the earthly life?
Which of the doctrines hitherto propounded can solve these problems? But, if we admit the
fact of our consecutive existences all these problems are solved in conformity with the divine
justice. What we are not able to do in one existence we do in another. None are exempted
from the action of the law of progress; every one is rewarded progressively, according to his
deserts, but no one is excluded from the eventual attainment of the highest felicity, no matter
what may be the obstacles he has to encounter on the road.
The questions growing out of the subject we are considering might be multiplied indefinitely,
for the psychologic and moral problems which can only find their solution in the plurality of
existences are innumerable. In the present considerations we have restricted our inquiry to
those which are most general in their nature. "But," it may still be urged by some objectors,
"whatever may be the arguments in its favour, the doctrine of reincarnation is not admitted by
the Church; its acceptance would therefore be the overthrow of religion."
It is not our intention to treat of the question, in this place, under the special aspect suggested
by the foregoing objection; it is sufficient for our present purpose to have shown the
eminently moral and rational character of the doctrine we are considering. But it may be
confidently asserted, that a doctrine which is both moral and rational cannot be antagonistic
to a religion which proclaims the Divine Being to be the most perfect goodness and