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IT Baseline Protection Manual - The Information Warfare Site

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Safeguard Catalogue - Personnel Remarks<br />

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2. Step: Alice encrypts this hash value with the secret signing key known<br />

only to her. <strong>The</strong> result is Alice’s digital signature for this file.<br />

3. Step: Alice transmits the digital signature together with the verification<br />

key certificate and the file to Bob.<br />

4. Step: Bob verifies the certificate (for example with the public key of a<br />

certification authority).<br />

5. Step: Bob calculates the hash value of the file he has received.<br />

6. Step: Bob decrypts the digital signature with the aid of the public<br />

verification key contained in the verification key certificate.<br />

7. Step: Bob compares the hash value calculated in step 4 and the<br />

decrypted signature. If they are identical, the digital signature is<br />

verified. If they are not identical, Bob cannot draw any further<br />

conclusions.<br />

8. Step: After the digital signature has been verified, Bob can rely on the<br />

following results:<br />

- If it is certain that indeed only Alice possesses the secret key,<br />

Bob can be sure that the digital signature was generated by<br />

Alice, who is shown in the verification key certificate.<br />

- <strong>The</strong> file that Bob has received is identical to the file for which<br />

Alice calculated the digital signature.<br />

It should be emphasised that digital signatures only safeguard the objectives of<br />

integrity and non-repudiation, but in no way confidentiality. A digitally signed<br />

message is transmitted as plain text; if it is confidential, it must be encrypted<br />

in addition.<br />

If a digitally signed file contains a declaration of intent from the signer, the<br />

declaration of intent can be attributed indisputably to the signer, if necessary<br />

even in a court of law, on the basis of the signature.<br />

<strong>The</strong> verification key certificates that are used are in turn themselves files that<br />

are digitally signed by the trustworthy body; these can be checked in the same<br />

way, and provide information about the verification key and the person who<br />

holds the matching secret signing key.<br />

It is worth noting the differences between MACs and digital signatures:<br />

- A digital signature can be verified by anyone who is in possession of the<br />

verification key certificate, whereas MACs can only be verified by the<br />

parties who know the secret authentication key.<br />

- Alice’s digital signature on a message can only be created by Alice; the<br />

MAC value of a message, on the other hand, can be generated by both<br />

parties, Alice and Bob (and anyone else who knows the secret<br />

authentication key). It is therefore impossible for MACs to be used for the<br />

purpose of ensuring non-repudiation.<br />

A law on digital signatures entered force for the Federal Republic of Germany<br />

in the form of Article 3 of the <strong>Information</strong> and Communication Services Act<br />

(Federal Law Gazette 1879, Part 1, 1997). This governs which security<br />

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<strong>IT</strong>-<strong>Baseline</strong> <strong>Protection</strong> <strong>Manual</strong>: Oktober 2000

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