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IT Baseline Protection Manual - The Information Warfare Site

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Safeguard Catalogue - Hardware & Software Remarks<br />

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provision should be made for monitoring and filtering the D-channel (see also<br />

S 4.62 Use of a D-channel filter).<br />

Circuit encrypters: <strong>The</strong> encryption of synchronous full-duplex permanent<br />

connections must be seen as a special case, because in this case confidentiality<br />

– even confidentiality of the traffic flow – can be guaranteed. If there is no<br />

data pending transmission, filler data is encrypted, so that continuous "noise"<br />

is always present on the line. <strong>The</strong> circuit encrypter represents an alternative to<br />

installing protected circuits.<br />

Security in packet-switched networks<br />

In packet-switched networks it is necessary to distinguish between<br />

connection-oriented and connectionless packet switching. In connectionoriented<br />

packet switching, a virtual connection is set up during the connection<br />

setup phase, as a result of which the data path through the packet network is<br />

subsequently established. After the connection is set up, packets are routed<br />

through the network along the same path on the basis of the assigned virtual<br />

channel number. Transmit and/or receive addresses are no longer necessary<br />

for this. One example is the X.25 network.<br />

In the case of connectionless packet switching there are no connection setup<br />

and cleardown phases. Packets are switched individually – among other things<br />

furnished with a source address and destination address. This is typical of<br />

LAN data traffic.<br />

<strong>The</strong> choice of layer on which the security mechanisms take effect determines<br />

which information components will be protected. <strong>The</strong> lower the chosen<br />

security layer, the more comprehensive the protection of the information.<br />

When the user data passes through the instances of layers 7 to 1 (transmitter),<br />

additional control information is added to the data. If therefore it is important<br />

to protect not only the user data but also the traffic flow, it makes sense to<br />

choose a low OSI layer. On the other hand it is also the case that the lower the<br />

chosen OSI layer, the fewer coupling elements (repeaters, bridges, switches,<br />

routers, gateways) can be overcome transparently.<br />

Coupling element Highest layer of<br />

coupling element<br />

Repeater 1<br />

Bridge, layer-2 switch 2<br />

Router, layer-3 switch, X.25 packet handler 3<br />

Gateway 7<br />

If it is intended that security services should take effect beyond coupling<br />

elements, they must be implemented in a layer above the highest layer (or<br />

sublayer) of the coupling elements. This ensures that the communication<br />

equipment can forward the secured information unprocessed and<br />

uninterpreted.<br />

Examples and consequences of incorrect network configurations:<br />

Example 1: In order to guarantee confidentiality, in particular in the sphere of<br />

public communication networks, all terminal devices in two LANS coupled<br />

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<strong>IT</strong>-<strong>Baseline</strong> <strong>Protection</strong> <strong>Manual</strong>: Oktober 2000

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