IT Baseline Protection Manual - The Information Warfare Site

Safeguard Catalogue - Organisation Remarks
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- Data volume: what volume of data needs to be protected?
- Frequency: how often is there a requirement for cryptographic services?
- Performance: how fast do cryptographic functions have to operate (off-line,
on-line rate)?
Personnel and organisational aspects
- User-friendliness: do users require basic knowledge of cryptography? Does
the use of a crypto product hamper them in their work?
- Reasonableness: what burden of extra work can users reasonably be
expected to take on (working time, waiting time)?
- Reliability: how reliably will users handle the crypto technology?
- Training requirements: to what extent do users need training?
- Personnel requirements: are additional staff required, for example for
installation, operation or key management?
- Availability: is it possible that availability will be reduced by the use of a
crypto product?
Economic aspects
- Financial constraints: how much is cryptographic protection allowed to
cost? How high are the
- non-recurring investment costs
- running costs, including personnel costs
- licence fees?
- Investment protection: do the planned cryptographic procedures and
products conform to existing standards? Are they interoperable with other
products?
Key recovery
If the keys used for encryption are lost, this generally also means that the data
protected by the keys is also lost. Many crypto products therefore include
functions for data recovery in such instances. Before these functions are used,
it is important to be clear about the risks involved: if it is possible to restore
confidential keys by these means, it must be ensured that this can only be done
by those with the appropriate authorisation. If it is possible to access the
original key user’s data without his or her knowledge, the user has no
possibility of proving that malicious manipulation has taken place. On account
of the mistrust with which it is viewed, the use of key recovery mechanisms
also often results in reservations being expressed within the company or
organisation where they are used, but also among communication partners.
Generally, therefore, key recovery should not be used in relation to data
transmission. There is no need for this, either, because if a key or data is lost,
it can simply be sent again. Careful thought should be given to the use of key
recovery when data is stored locally (see also S 6.56 Data backup when using
cryptographic procedures). The CD-ROM accompanying the IT Baseline
Protection Manual contains an article on the possibilities and risks of key
recovery in the Auxiliary Materials directory.
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IT-Baseline Protection Manual: Oktober 2000