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IT Baseline Protection Manual - The Information Warfare Site

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Safeguard Catalogue - Hardware & Software Remarks<br />

____________________________________________________________________ .........................................<br />

S 4.82 Secure configuration of active network<br />

components<br />

Initiation responsibility: Head of <strong>IT</strong> Section, <strong>IT</strong> Security Management<br />

Implementation responsibility: Administrators<br />

In addition to the security of server systems and terminal devices, that of the<br />

actual network infrastructure together with its active network components is<br />

often neglected. Particularly central, active network components need to be<br />

configured in a careful fashion. Whereas a faulty configuration of a server<br />

system only affects persons making use of the services offered by this system,<br />

a faulty configuration of a router can lead to a failure of large subnetworks, if<br />

not the entire network, and cause data to be corrupted unnoticed.<br />

A secure configuration of active network components must also be defined as<br />

part of the network concept (refer to S 2.141 Development of a network<br />

concept). Particular attention must be paid to the following items here:<br />

- For routers and layer-3 switching, a decision is required as to which<br />

protocols should be forwarded and which should be barred. This can be<br />

achieved through the use of suitable filters.<br />

- A specification is required as to which <strong>IT</strong> systems are to communicate in<br />

which direction via the routers. This can also be achieved through the<br />

implementation of filter rules.<br />

- Insofar as it is supported by the active network components, a specification<br />

is also required as to which <strong>IT</strong> systems are to have access to the ports of the<br />

switches and hubs of the local network. For this, the MAC address of the<br />

calling <strong>IT</strong> system is evaluated to determine whether the system has been<br />

granted access authorisation.<br />

For active network components with a routing functionality, appropriate<br />

protection of the routing updates is also necessary. <strong>The</strong>se are required for<br />

updating the routing tables in order to allow dynamic adaptation to the current<br />

status of the local network. A distinction can be made here between two<br />

security mechanisms:<br />

- Passwords<br />

<strong>The</strong> use of passwords prevents configured routers from accepting routing<br />

updates from routers which are not in possession of the corresponding<br />

password. This protects routers against an acceptance of incorrect or<br />

invalid routing updates. <strong>The</strong> advantage of passwords in comparison with<br />

other protective mechanisms is their low overhead, which only needs a<br />

narrow bandwidth and short computing times.<br />

- Cryptographic checksums<br />

Checksums provide protection against concealed modifications to valid<br />

routing updates as they pass through the network. Together with a<br />

sequence number or a unique identifier, a checksum can also provide<br />

protection against the reloading of old updates.<br />

____________________________________________________________________ .........................................<br />

<strong>IT</strong>-<strong>Baseline</strong> <strong>Protection</strong> <strong>Manual</strong>: Oktober 2000

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