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IT Baseline Protection Manual - The Information Warfare Site

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Safeguard Catalogue - Organisation Remarks<br />

____________________________________________________________________ .........................................<br />

Establishment of the Consoles, Devices with exchangeable data media, and<br />

printers.<br />

- A firewall is based on a security policy defined for the network requiring<br />

protection and allows only the connections contained herein. It must be<br />

possible to permit these connections separately according to IP address,<br />

service, time, direction and user.<br />

- Suitable personnel must be available for the planning and operation of a<br />

firewall. <strong>The</strong> time required to operate a firewall must not be<br />

underestimated. Experience has shown that an analysis of the accumulated<br />

log data alone is very time consuming. A firewall administrator must have<br />

a detailed knowledge of the <strong>IT</strong> components used and be trained<br />

accordingly.<br />

- <strong>The</strong> users of the local network should only be affected by the use of a<br />

firewall to the smallest possible extent.<br />

A firewall can protect the internal network against many of the dangers<br />

encountered when connecting to the Internet, but not against all of them. Thus,<br />

when a firewall is established and a firewall security policy is elaborated, it is<br />

necessary to be aware of the firewall's limits.<br />

- Protocols are tested, not the contents. Testing the protocol confirms, for<br />

example, that an E-mail was delivered using commands that comply with<br />

the rules, but cannot provide any information about the actual content of<br />

the E-mail.<br />

- <strong>The</strong> filtering of active contents may only be partially successful.<br />

- As soon users are allowed to communicate over a firewall, they can create<br />

a tunnel from the protocol they are using for any other protocol. An<br />

internal perpetrator could thereby enable an external party to access<br />

internal computers.<br />

- In reality, it is not possible to restrict Internet access to certain Web servers<br />

because too many WWW servers can be used as proxies, making it easy to<br />

bypass the blockage of particular IP addresses.<br />

- <strong>The</strong> filter software is often still immature. For instance, it possible that<br />

some forms of address are not included. <strong>The</strong> following example with the<br />

BSI Web server shows which possible forms of address are available. <strong>The</strong><br />

list is far from complete, as individual letters can also be represented by<br />

escape sequences.<br />

WWW.BSI.BUND.DE<br />

WWW.BSI.DE<br />

194.95.176.226<br />

3261051106<br />

- <strong>The</strong> filtering of spam mails is not yet fully developed. No firewall can<br />

determine beyond doubt whether a user wishes to receive a particular Email<br />

or not. Spam mails will only disappear when it is possible to be sure<br />

who the sender is, and it will take a while before this happens.<br />

- Firewalls do not safeguard systems against all denial of service attacks. For<br />

example, if a perpetrator disables the connection to the provider, even the<br />

____________________________________________________________________ .........................................<br />

<strong>IT</strong>-<strong>Baseline</strong> <strong>Protection</strong> <strong>Manual</strong>: Oktober 2000

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