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IT Baseline Protection Manual - The Information Warfare Site

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Safeguard Catalogue - Communications Remarks<br />

____________________________________________________________________ .........................................<br />

- Pass phrase<br />

A pass phrase (also referred to as a "mantra") must be entered when<br />

generating a key; this protects the file with the private keys from<br />

unauthorised access. As with every password, this should also not be easy<br />

to guess.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re are Trojan horses in circulation, for example, which selectively<br />

target the file with the private keys (SECRING.PGP) and send it to an<br />

external address by e-mail. If the chosen pass phrase is too simple, it will<br />

not offer sufficient resistance to brute force attacks (automated password<br />

guessing). <strong>The</strong> pass phrase should therefore consist of at least ten<br />

characters and include special characters.<br />

- User ID<br />

<strong>The</strong> public PGP keys are associated with a user ID, which if possible<br />

should be unique and also contain the e-mail address, e.g. userA@bsi.de.<br />

- To generate keys, PGP requires starting values that are as random as<br />

possible. <strong>The</strong> user is therefore asked to type in an arbitrary text. It is better<br />

in this case to enter "real" text; for example, it would be possible to type in<br />

this paragraph. Simply "typing away" on the keyboard usually produces<br />

worse results.<br />

Safekeeping of keys<br />

<strong>The</strong> private keys are stored in the file named SECRING.PGP. Although access<br />

to this file is protected by the pass phrase, it should not be stored on local<br />

networks, not even on insufficiently secure standalone systems. Key rings<br />

(collections of keys) should be stored on floppy disk, which the user must<br />

keep in a safe place. Preference is to be given to using chip cards for storing<br />

keys.<br />

A backup copy of the SECRING.PGP file should also be created, and a note<br />

made of the pass phrase. <strong>The</strong> backup copy and the pass phrase should be<br />

stored securely, and best of all separately, to ensure that the private key will<br />

not be lost as a result of a hard disk crash or because of an operator error.<br />

Messages which have been encrypted with the public key can no longer be<br />

decrypted if this happens.<br />

Writing down the pass phrase and placing it in safekeeping in a secure<br />

location should be seen as a critical process serving solely the purpose of<br />

contingency planning. A locked drawer in a desk or a similar "secure" location<br />

can under no circumstances be recommended as a storage location for the<br />

secret key or for the pass phrase.<br />

Distribution of keys<br />

For a recipient to be able to check the digital signature of the sender of a file<br />

or for the sender of a message to be able encrypt a message for a certain<br />

recipient, it is necessary to have the public key of the communication partner<br />

in each case. This can be obtained in various ways: for example as an<br />

attachment to an e-mail or from a WWW server. However, the user must<br />

satisfy himself that the key really belongs to the specified person. Certificates<br />

____________________________________________________________________ .........................................<br />

<strong>IT</strong>-<strong>Baseline</strong> <strong>Protection</strong> <strong>Manual</strong>: Oktober 2000

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