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IT Baseline Protection Manual - The Information Warfare Site

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Safeguard Catalogue - Hardware & Software Remarks<br />

____________________________________________________________________ .........................................<br />

S 4.80 Secure access mechanisms for remote<br />

administration<br />

Initiation responsibility: Head of <strong>IT</strong> Section, <strong>IT</strong> Security Management<br />

Implementation responsibility: Administrators<br />

Some active network components can be administered or monitored remotely<br />

via network access. This access is performed by means of connectionless or<br />

connection-oriented protocols. Such protocols include:<br />

- Protocols intended exclusively for the transmission of data comprising, for<br />

example, new firmware versions or configuration files such as FTP, TFTP<br />

(in general, use of the latter is not recommended) or RCP (also refer to S<br />

6.52 Regular backup of configuration data of active network components)<br />

- Protocols for interactive communications, e.g. Telnet<br />

- Protocols for network management, e.g. SNMP or CMIP<br />

For all types of access, measures must be taken to ensure that no unauthorised<br />

access takes place.<br />

For this purpose, the default passwords and community names of the network<br />

components must be replaced with secure passwords and community names<br />

(refer to S 4.82 Secure configuration of active network components). In the<br />

case of many active network components, the coupling of community names<br />

and passwords influences the FTP, Telnet, SNMP and CMIP protocols. Some<br />

components also allow restriction of access on the basis of MAC or IP<br />

addresses. This option should be used wherever possible, in order to permit<br />

access exclusively from dedicated management stations.<br />

Data transmission protocols (TFTP, FTP, RCP) should only be activated from<br />

the network components themselves. This applies in particular to nonauthenticating<br />

protocols such as TFTP. For interactive communication<br />

protocols (Telnet), the auto-logout option of the network components should<br />

be activated.<br />

In the case of most protocols, it must be noted that passwords and community<br />

names are transmitted in plain text, i.e. they can be intercepted in principle<br />

(refer to S 5.61 Suitable physical segmentation and S 5.62 Suitable logical<br />

segmentation).<br />

Example: <strong>The</strong> "public" and "private" default community names in SNMP<br />

should be replaced with other names.<br />

Additional controls:<br />

- Have all default passwords and community names been replaced with<br />

secure, user-defined passwords and names?<br />

- Can data transmission only be initiated from the network components?<br />

____________________________________________________________________ .........................................<br />

<strong>IT</strong>-<strong>Baseline</strong> <strong>Protection</strong> <strong>Manual</strong>: Oktober 2000

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