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IT Baseline Protection Manual - The Information Warfare Site

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Safeguard Catalogue - Organisation Remarks<br />

____________________________________________________________________ .........................................<br />

S 2.46 Appropriate key management<br />

Initiation responsibility: <strong>IT</strong> Security Management<br />

Implementation responsibility: <strong>IT</strong> Security Management, <strong>IT</strong> Procedures<br />

Officer<br />

<strong>The</strong> use of cryptographic security mechanisms (such as encryption or digital<br />

signatures) requires that suitable keys must be created, distributed and<br />

installed using confidential and authenticated procedures, with integrity<br />

ensured. Keys which have become known to unauthorised users, which have<br />

been corrupted in the course of distribution or which perhaps even originate<br />

from uncontrolled sources (this also applies to the agreement of keys between<br />

communication partners) are just as capable of compromising a cryptographic<br />

security mechanism as poor quality keys which have been generated in an<br />

unsuitable way. Good quality keys are usually created using suitable key<br />

generators (see below). Attention must be paid to the following points<br />

regarding key management:<br />

Key generation<br />

Key generation should be performed in a secure environment using suitable<br />

key generators. Cryptographic keys can either be generated directly at the<br />

place where they are used (usually initiated by the user) or they can be<br />

generated at a central location. When keys are generated locally, it usually has<br />

to be accepted that the security of the environment will be less stringent,<br />

whereas when keys are generated centrally it must be ensured that they reach<br />

their users authentically and without being compromised.<br />

Suitable key generators must produce controlled, statistically evenly<br />

distributed random sequences, making use of the entire possible key space. To<br />

do this, for example, a noise source generates random bit sequences, which are<br />

post-processed with a logic unit. <strong>The</strong> quality of the keys obtained in this way<br />

is then examined using a variety of test procedures.<br />

Some crypto modules, especially those which do not have an integrated<br />

random number generator, make use of user inputs for the generation of keys.<br />

For example, these modules may ask for passwords from which a key is<br />

subsequently derived, or the user is prompted to type in an arbitrary text in<br />

order to obtain random starting values for generating a key. Passwords used in<br />

such circumstances should be carefully chosen and as long as possible. If<br />

users are requested to make entries that are as random as possible, they should<br />

really be random, in other words difficult to predict.<br />

Separation of keys<br />

If possible, cryptographic keys should be employed for only one purpose. In<br />

particular, it is important never to use the same keys both for encryption and<br />

for the generation of signatures. This makes sense for a number of reasons:<br />

- If one key is disclosed, only some procedures will be affected, not all of<br />

them.<br />

- It may sometimes be necessary to divulge encryption keys (when a deputy<br />

or substitute is used).<br />

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<strong>IT</strong>-<strong>Baseline</strong> <strong>Protection</strong> <strong>Manual</strong>: Oktober 2000

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