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IT Baseline Protection Manual - The Information Warfare Site

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Safeguard Catalogue - Organisation Remarks<br />

____________________________________________________________________ .........................................<br />

S 2.33 Division of Administrator roles under UNIX<br />

Initiation responsibility: Head of <strong>IT</strong> Section, <strong>IT</strong> Security Management<br />

Implementation responsibility: Administrator<br />

In most UNIX systems, there is only one Administrator role (the superuser,<br />

who is known as root and has the user ID (UID) 0). Persons with access to this<br />

role have full control over the system. In particular, they can read, modify and<br />

delete any file, irrespective of access rights.<br />

<strong>The</strong> superuser password must only be known to the Administrators.<br />

Disclosure of that password must be restricted to the cases defined in the<br />

pertinent procedures, and must be documented. <strong>The</strong> superuser log-in root can<br />

additionally be protected by applying the two-person rule, e.g. through<br />

organisational measures such as a split password. In that case, the password<br />

must have an extended minimum length (12 characters or more). Steps must<br />

be taken to ensure that the password, in its full minimum length, is checked by<br />

the system.<br />

For a number of UNIX systems, division of responsibilities can be achieved<br />

by making use of existing Administrator roles. In such cases, those roles must<br />

be assumed by different persons.<br />

A number of administration activities can also be carried out without access to<br />

the root log- in. Where Administrators with such special functions exist, use<br />

should be made of this option. Especially in those cases where, for large<br />

systems, administration functions have to be assigned to several persons, the<br />

risks involved can be reduced through appropriate division of responsibilities.<br />

This can be done in two ways:<br />

- Introduction of administrative log-ins. While these have the UID 0, only<br />

one program will be started during log-in, with which the administrative<br />

function can be executed and which ends with a log-out. Examples:<br />

designation of new users, mounting of a drive. In UNIX V.4, for example,<br />

the administrative log-in names setup, sysadm, powerdown, checkfsys,<br />

mountfsys and umountfsys may be configured with programs of identical<br />

names.<br />

- Use of log-ins without the UID 0: <strong>The</strong>se log-in names (sys, bin, adm, uucp,<br />

nuucp, daemon and lp) are owners of files and programs which are crucial<br />

for the functionality of the system and thus are afforded particular<br />

protection. In most UNIX systems, they have been preconfigured for<br />

administration of the relevant services.<br />

To determine which log-ins have Administrator rights, auxiliary programs<br />

such as USE<strong>IT</strong>, cops, tiger should be used regularly to search for log-ins<br />

which contain UID 0 in the password file.<br />

Additional controls:<br />

- Who knows the superuser password?<br />

- Have Administrator roles been split up?<br />

- Which log-ins have the UID 0?<br />

- Are there any log-ins with UID 0 and shell access?<br />

____________________________________________________________________ .........................................<br />

<strong>IT</strong>-<strong>Baseline</strong> <strong>Protection</strong> <strong>Manual</strong>: Oktober 2000

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