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IT Baseline Protection Manual - The Information Warfare Site

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Threats Catalogue Deliberate Acts Remarks<br />

____________________________________________________________________ .........................................<br />

T 2.59 Operation of non-registered components<br />

As a rule, all components of a network should be known to the system<br />

administration. On an organisational level, it should be guaranteed that new<br />

components are registered with and released by the system administration, for<br />

example through automatic reporting from the purchasing organisation or a<br />

corresponding request from the organisational unit operating the components.<br />

Non-registered components are a security risk as they are not integrated in<br />

organisational in-house processes and controls. On the one hand, this can<br />

cause problems for the users of non-registered components (e.g. loss of data,<br />

as the system is not integrated into the data backup). On the other hand, it can<br />

also jeopardise other network components. For example, weaknesses can arise<br />

through unrecorded access points to the network if they are poorly protected<br />

against unauthorised access or not even protected at all. In particular, as such<br />

components are not controlled by the network management and/or the system<br />

management, errors in the configuration of the local system can lead to a gap<br />

in security.<br />

Example:<br />

<strong>The</strong> administrator uses the system management system to maintain the<br />

passwords (community names) for the network management system in use<br />

which is based on SNMP. A workgroup buys a new network PC but forgets to<br />

report this to the central administration. At installation, the password<br />

(community name) for the local SNMP demon is set to "public". This<br />

password is well-known. Perpetrators can now start an SNMP-based attack, as<br />

they have full access to the SNMP data. A PC compromised in this way can<br />

serve as a starting point for further perpetration to the internal network. For<br />

example, password sniffers could be installed.<br />

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<strong>IT</strong>-<strong>Baseline</strong> <strong>Protection</strong> <strong>Manual</strong>: Oktober 2000

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