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IT Baseline Protection Manual - The Information Warfare Site

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Safeguard Catalogue - Organisation Remarks<br />

____________________________________________________________________ .........................................<br />

5.36 Encryption under UNIX and Windows NT and S 4.34 Using<br />

Encryption, Checksums or Digital Signatures)<br />

- Requirements concerning data privacy<br />

If person-related data are to be processed with the product, additional<br />

special technical requirements should be placed beside the stated security<br />

functions in order to be able to comply with data privacy stipulations.<br />

Strength of the Mechanisms<br />

Security functions are implemented by mechanisms. Depending on the field of<br />

usage, these mechanisms must be of various strengths which provide defence<br />

against attacks. <strong>The</strong> necessary strength of the mechanisms is set forth in the<br />

Requirements Catalogue. According to <strong>IT</strong>SEC, differentiations are made<br />

between three mechanism strengths:<br />

- low: offers protection against unintentional attacks, e.g. operational<br />

errors<br />

- medium: offers protection against attackers with limited opportunities or<br />

resources.-<br />

- high: can only be overcome by attackers with an extensive knowledge,<br />

opportunities and resources. A successful attack is generally not considered<br />

possible.<br />

Examples of Requirements on Security Features<br />

Below are examples of some important security functions which highlight<br />

typical requirements placed on security features.<br />

In the event that the product is to have an identification and authentication<br />

mechanism, the following requirements could be made, for example:<br />

- Access should only be possible via a defined interface. A log-on<br />

mechanism can be used, for instance, which requires unique user<br />

identification and a password. In the event that the identity of the user is<br />

known when the <strong>IT</strong> system is accessed, an anonymous password is<br />

sufficient. Other possibilities are processes based on certain "tokens", such<br />

as a chip card.<br />

- <strong>The</strong> access procedure itself must correctly handle the critical parameters,<br />

such as password, user identification etc. Current passwords should thus<br />

never be stored unencrypted on the relevant <strong>IT</strong> systems.<br />

- <strong>The</strong> access procedure must react to incorrect entries in a predefined<br />

manner. For instance, if an incorrect authentication takes places three times<br />

consecutively, the access to the product should be rejected. Alternatively,<br />

the time intervals in which further access attempts can be made should be<br />

gradually increased.<br />

- <strong>The</strong> access procedure must allow certain minimum requirements for<br />

security-critical parameters to be set. <strong>The</strong> minimum length of a password,<br />

for example, should be 6 characters, the minimum length of a PIN should<br />

be 3 digits. <strong>The</strong> syntax for passwords can also be stated, as necessary.<br />

____________________________________________________________________ .........................................<br />

<strong>IT</strong>-<strong>Baseline</strong> <strong>Protection</strong> <strong>Manual</strong>: Oktober 2000

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