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IT Baseline Protection Manual - The Information Warfare Site

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Safeguard Catalogue - Organisation Remarks<br />

____________________________________________________________________ .........................................<br />

In networked <strong>IT</strong> infrastructures it is no longer sufficient to guarantee the<br />

security of an individual domain. Instead, the security of all terminal<br />

equipment and transmission systems forming part of the network must be<br />

dovetailed to act in concert. Such harmonisation proves to be especially<br />

difficult particularly in those cases where the equipment is not networked<br />

within one organisational unit (such as a LAN environment) but rather where<br />

there is a combination of <strong>IT</strong> installations with different areas of responsibility<br />

and fields of application.<br />

<strong>The</strong> use - but also the functionality and technological design - of an <strong>IT</strong><br />

security system is determined by numerous influencing factors, such as<br />

localisation, the level of security, and the frequency and scope of application,<br />

which represent important terms of reference and decision-making conditions<br />

for <strong>IT</strong> security management. Furthermore the technical means of<br />

implementing and designing an <strong>IT</strong> security system are also widely varied: for<br />

example integrated in an application on a workstation, in a firewall or as a<br />

special component for network components such as switches or routers. It is<br />

only possible to achieve an affordable price level for a crypto product if it can<br />

be used for a broad cross section of purposes. A standardised system link and<br />

uniform operating conditions play an important role in this, for example. One<br />

last point relates to the interaction of the security services on various protocol<br />

layers. <strong>The</strong> security services on the higher protocol layers (according to the<br />

OSI reference model) generally only provide sufficient protection if the lower<br />

layers also provide protection (see S 4.90).<br />

It is also important to define a cryptography policy specific to the<br />

organisation. <strong>The</strong> following points must be clarified from the standpoint of the<br />

management:<br />

- What are the protection requirements or what security level is it considered<br />

necessary to achieve?<br />

- What budget and how many staff are available in order to set up the<br />

planned security mechanisms and - very important - also to guarantee<br />

operation?<br />

- What system link is aimed for and what are the prevailing operating<br />

conditions for security components?<br />

- What scope of functions and performance is aimed for?<br />

- Who takes responsibility in the final analysis?<br />

<strong>The</strong> crypto concept must also include a description of the technical and<br />

organisational use of the cryptographic products, i.e. the following points, for<br />

example:<br />

- Who is given which access rights?<br />

- What services are offered remotely?<br />

- How is the management of passwords and keys to be handled, with regard<br />

to their period of validity, use of characters, length and allocation?<br />

- Does the data have to be encrypted or signed, and if so, when and how?<br />

____________________________________________________________________ .........................................<br />

<strong>IT</strong>-<strong>Baseline</strong> <strong>Protection</strong> <strong>Manual</strong>: Oktober 2000

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