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IT Baseline Protection Manual - The Information Warfare Site

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Safeguard Catalogue - Hardware & Software Remarks<br />

____________________________________________________________________ .........................................<br />

S 4.63 Security-related requirements for<br />

telecommuting computers<br />

Initiation responsibility: Agency/company management; <strong>IT</strong> Security<br />

Management<br />

Implementation responsibility: Head of <strong>IT</strong> Section, Administrator<br />

<strong>The</strong> security-related requirements for telecommuting computers depend on the<br />

degree of protection needed for data at remote workstations and the nature of<br />

the data which telecommuters can access from the telecommuting computer of<br />

the institution. <strong>The</strong> higher the required degree of protection, the greater the<br />

number of security measures entailed. General security objectives for<br />

telecommuting computers include the following:<br />

- Telecommuting computers must only be used by authorised persons.<br />

This ensures that only authorised persons can use data and programs which<br />

are stored on the remote workstation or accessible via the communications<br />

computer at the institution. Authorised persons include administrators of<br />

telecommuting computers, telecommuters and their stand-ins.<br />

- Telecommuting computers must only be used for authorised purposes.<br />

This helps prevent telecommuters from using or modifying <strong>IT</strong> for<br />

unauthorised purposes, thus avoiding misuse and damage caused by<br />

improper handling.<br />

- Damage caused by theft or malfunctioning of a telecommuting computer<br />

must remain within tolerable limits.<br />

Telecommuting workstations are usually installed in an insecure<br />

environment, thus exposed to the danger of theft. In the event of a theft, the<br />

availability and, possibly, the confidentiality of the data stored on the<br />

stolen computer are impaired. <strong>The</strong> potential damage arising here should be<br />

minimised.<br />

- Attempted or successful manipulation of remote workstations should be<br />

clearly recognisable for telecommuters.<br />

This ensures that remote workstations remain in an integral state even if<br />

attempts at manipulation cannot be precluded.<br />

<strong>The</strong> following functions are useful for remote workstations:<br />

- Telecommuting workstations must have an identification and<br />

authentication mechanism. <strong>The</strong> following conditions must be met, in<br />

particular:<br />

- Critical security-related parameters such as passwords, user IDs etc.<br />

are managed reliably. Passwords are never stored in unencrypted<br />

form on telecommuting workstations.<br />

- Access mechanisms respond to incorrect entries in a defined manner.<br />

For example, if an incorrect attempt at authentication is made three<br />

times in a row, access to the remote workstation is denied, or the<br />

____________________________________________________________________ .........................................<br />

<strong>IT</strong>-<strong>Baseline</strong> <strong>Protection</strong> <strong>Manual</strong>: Oktober 2000

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