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IT Baseline Protection Manual - The Information Warfare Site

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Safeguard Catalogue - Communications Remarks<br />

____________________________________________________________________ .........................................<br />

Tunnelling at Layer 2: PPTP and L2TP<br />

<strong>The</strong> Layer 2 tunnel protocols can tunnel both the most commonly used<br />

protocols, but differ as to over which underlying protocols tunnelling is<br />

possible: PPTP can only be transmitted over an IP-based network, whereas<br />

L2TP can also be transmitted over various WAN protocols and hence offers<br />

greater flexibility. <strong>The</strong> chart below shows how packets in an application are<br />

assembled by PPTP over a PPP connection. As can be seen from the table<br />

above, several independent tunnels (e.g. with different levels of quality<br />

assurance) can be generated with the more recent L2TP protocol. During user<br />

identification and encryption the security mechanisms of the underlining PPP<br />

connection make themselves felt under both protocols.<br />

Application data<br />

IP TCP/UDP Application data<br />

GRE PPP IP TCP/UDP Application data<br />

IP<br />

UDP PPP IP TCP/UDP Application data<br />

PPP IP UDP PPP IP TCP/UDP Application data<br />

= Optionally encrypted and compressed<br />

____________________________________________________________________ .........................................<br />

<strong>IT</strong>-<strong>Baseline</strong> <strong>Protection</strong> <strong>Manual</strong>: Oktober 2000<br />

Application<br />

TCP/IP stack<br />

PPTP driver<br />

TCP/IP stack<br />

PPP driver<br />

Figure: Assembly of packets of application data with the PPTP protocol<br />

Security mechanisms of the PPP protocol<br />

1. User authentication<br />

Most implementations of the PPP protocol support the following standard<br />

procedures for user authentication (see also S 5.50 Authentication via<br />

PAP/CHAP):<br />

- Password Authentication Protocol (PAP). <strong>The</strong> PPP-Server requests<br />

transmission of a user name and password by the PPP client. Both<br />

items are transmitted here in plaintext. This mechanism is insecure<br />

and cannot protect against "Replay" attacks, under which an<br />

unauthorised person can re-send the data intercepted at a later time.<br />

Use of the PAP authentication protocol is therefore not advised.<br />

- Challenge-Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP). <strong>The</strong> PPP<br />

sends a "challenge", consisting of a session ID and a random<br />

sequence of letters, the "challenge string", to the PPP client. <strong>The</strong><br />

client sends back the user name in plaintext as the reply, together<br />

with the MD5 hash value made out of a combination of session ID,<br />

challenge string and user password. Here the password is not sent in<br />

plaintext. <strong>The</strong> use of the random sequence of letters ensures that the<br />

protocol protects against Replay attacks.<br />

2. Data encryption and key management<br />

In the initialisation phase of the PPP protocol, the procedures to be used for<br />

data encryption (and compression) are negotiated between client and<br />

server. In general any procedure may be used here as long as client and

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