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IT Baseline Protection Manual - The Information Warfare Site

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Safeguard Catalogue - Communications Remarks<br />

____________________________________________________________________ .........................................<br />

data between the subnets. In addition, the filters must be configured by default<br />

such that communications are initially restricted to the greatest possible extent<br />

and only enabled subsequently for individual services as the requirements for<br />

them arise. If necessary, IP-specific filtering should be considered here.<br />

router<br />

t f f FTP d t transfer of FTP data<br />

Figure 3: Example of segmentation into subnetworks on layer 3 by a router<br />

Data and network integrity<br />

As a rule, the integrity of data up to layer 3 is ensured by the network access<br />

protocol in use, whilst additional measures are required to ensure network<br />

integrity, i.e. concordance between the actual network environment and the<br />

planned physical, as well as logical, segmentation. <strong>The</strong>se measures must<br />

prevent the establishment of unauthorised or incorrect communications links,<br />

as well as unauthorised system access which would impair the integrity of the<br />

network.<br />

Consequently, network integrity is essentially ensured by<br />

- Preventing, or at least detecting, direct modifications to network<br />

components (replacement of components or installation of new,<br />

unauthorised components). This is termed hardware-based security.<br />

- Preventing, or at least detecting, changes to the configuration of network<br />

components (routing protocols, port-switching matrices or VLAN<br />

allocations). This is termed software-based security.<br />

For this, it is necessary to restrict physical access to the network components<br />

to a sufficient extent (e.g. by implementing infrastructure-specific measures<br />

for the distributor room, cabling etc.) and conceive the network management<br />

system so as to prevent unauthorised access to the network components via the<br />

network.<br />

<strong>The</strong> use of network components alone does not serve to enhance protection of<br />

the integrity of data on layer 3 (e.g. application data), although it does hinder<br />

selective attacks on data integrity. For this purpose, network components can<br />

be used which prevent data packets from being tapped and manipulated. Such<br />

components comprise, for example, bridges / switches and routers which can<br />

be used to separate a network into segments or subnetworks between which<br />

data communications are to be controlled, restricted or configured. A mapping<br />

of logical relationships to a physical configuration plays a key role,<br />

____________________________________________________________________ .........................................<br />

<strong>IT</strong>-<strong>Baseline</strong> <strong>Protection</strong> <strong>Manual</strong>: Oktober 2000<br />

no transfer of<br />

FTP data possible

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