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IT Baseline Protection Manual - The Information Warfare Site

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Safeguard Catalogue - Communications Remarks<br />

____________________________________________________________________ .........................................<br />

S 5.76 Use of suitable tunnel protocols for RAS<br />

communication<br />

Initiation responsibility: Head of <strong>IT</strong> Section, <strong>IT</strong> Security Management<br />

Team<br />

Implementation responsibility: Administrator<br />

Remote access to a LAN is effected through a data link which is generally<br />

shared with external third parties. Thus, for example, direct dial-in entails use<br />

of the network of the telecommunications provider. If the connection is<br />

established over the Internet, then the data is forwarded over the networks of<br />

the Internet service providers involved (and possibly their partners). Since<br />

logging on of the RAS client to a LAN is effected over a RAS connection, the<br />

network path used for data transmission must be protected so that the security<br />

of the data (confidentiality, integrity, authenticity) is safeguarded. This<br />

protection is achieved through encryption and digital signing of the data<br />

packets exchanged after the communications partners have been authenticated<br />

(see also S 4.34 Using encryption, checksums or digital signatures). In the<br />

RAS environment, various procedures and mechanisms for protecting the<br />

communications link (e.g. tunnelling, see below) have been developed.<br />

<strong>The</strong> choice of which procedure to use to protect a RAS connection depends on<br />

various factors such as:<br />

- the security requirements regarding the strength of the procedure (for<br />

example, this determines the key lengths),<br />

- the procedures which can be used at protocol level (see below),<br />

- the procedures supported by the RAS hardware and software.<br />

In general, the following applies:<br />

- <strong>The</strong> RAS product normally offers a selection of standard procedures<br />

supported for the protection of communications. <strong>The</strong> aim here should be to<br />

have the widest possible range of procedures supported.<br />

- <strong>The</strong> actual protocols used for data transport also offer security<br />

mechanisms. <strong>The</strong>se can be used by the RAS product. Alternatively, the<br />

RAS product may offer a procedure of its own.<br />

<strong>The</strong> security mechanisms are based on different cryptographic procedures.<br />

Safeguard S 3.23 contains a brief introduction to basic cryptographic concepts.<br />

Encryption of protocol connections: tunnelling<br />

If an encrypted data connection is established between two communications<br />

partners, then this connection constitutes a "secure channel". Any data can be<br />

securely transmitted over this channel with the underlying communications<br />

protocol (e.g. IP). If the data transmitted is in the form of data packets of a<br />

communications protocol, then the term "tunnel" is used also. <strong>The</strong> protocol<br />

which is used to encrypt the data, transmit it through the tunnel and manage<br />

the connection is also referred to as tunnel protocol. With tunnel protocols<br />

distinctions can be made as to<br />

____________________________________________________________________ .........................................<br />

<strong>IT</strong>-<strong>Baseline</strong> <strong>Protection</strong> <strong>Manual</strong>: Oktober 2000<br />

<strong>Protection</strong> of RAS<br />

communication

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