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IT Baseline Protection Manual - The Information Warfare Site

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Threats Catalogue Deliberate Acts Remarks<br />

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T 5.98 Interception of mobile telephone calls<br />

<strong>The</strong> easiest way of listening in on a conversation conducted over a mobile<br />

phone is simply to listen from close by. It is no rare occurrence to hear a<br />

person divulging a lot of company-internal information by talking loudly on<br />

the telephone in a public place (see also T 3.45 Inadequate checking of the<br />

identity of communication partners).<br />

But generally there are also very elaborate technical means available for<br />

intercepting telephone calls.<br />

If, for example, an adversary can gain access to the technical facilities of the<br />

network provider (lines, switching exchanges, base stations), he will then be<br />

able to listen to any telephone conversation conducted over this equipment.<br />

This applies to connections both in the mobile communication network and in<br />

the landline network. However, deliberate tapping of conversations which are<br />

assigned to a particular call number is extremely effort-intensive, due to the<br />

huge flood of data.<br />

If the calls are connected over line-connected paths from the base station to<br />

the mobile telephone exchange, a physical attack on the cable paths is<br />

necessary. If a base station is connected to the mobile telephone exchange<br />

over an unencrypted directional radio link, as is the case with some network<br />

providers, it is possible to intercept and tap these radio signals unnoticed using<br />

antennae and special receivers. <strong>The</strong> threat is all the greater if all phone calls<br />

for the connected base station are transmitted over these directional radio<br />

links.<br />

Telephone conversations are also transmitted bundled over directional radio<br />

relay links in the landline network. As these transmissions are generally<br />

unencrypted, conversations transmitted by this route can also be tapped with a<br />

certain amount of technical effort.<br />

In Germany, the transmission of radio signals between mobile phone and base<br />

station is encrypted in all GSM mobile communication networks. <strong>The</strong>re are<br />

special interception devices around which exploit the weakness of one-sided<br />

authentication in the GSM network (the only authentication which occurs is<br />

the authentication of the mobile phone to the base station), by pretending to<br />

mobile phones to be a base station, disabling encryption and instituting<br />

plaintext operation. Depending on the statutory requirements, in some<br />

countries encryption of transmissions can be completely disabled. It may also<br />

be possible that other security parameters such as the frequency of key<br />

changes are weaker.<br />

Other possible ways of disabling this encryption are tampering with the<br />

mobile phone or the technical facilities of the network provider.<br />

____________________________________________________________________ .........................................<br />

<strong>IT</strong>-<strong>Baseline</strong> <strong>Protection</strong> <strong>Manual</strong>: Oktober 2000

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