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IT Baseline Protection Manual - The Information Warfare Site

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Safeguard Catalogue - Organisation Remarks<br />

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Confidentiality<br />

As the messages are to be encrypted, one or more encryption algorithms must<br />

be implemented. On account of the higher performance that they offer,<br />

symmetrical procedures tend to suggest themselves.<br />

Key management<br />

- Creation: the keys for the symmetrical procedure must be generated by a<br />

suitable (random) process in such a way that guessing or predicting further<br />

keys is practically impossible, even if some of the preceding keys are<br />

known.<br />

- Key agreement/exchange: as the central provision of keys by means of<br />

symmetrical procedures is out of the question in the Internet simply<br />

because of the sheer mass of potential communications partners, the use of<br />

asymmetrical procedures for key agreement and key exchange is<br />

imperative.<br />

Authenticity<br />

As an asymmetrical procedure is implemented anyway because of the<br />

requirements relating to key management (and non-repudiation may be<br />

required), a digital signature is used for this purpose. Signature keys should be<br />

used solely for the purpose of attaching signatures. In this connection, as is<br />

always the case when using public key techniques, the problem of the<br />

authenticity of public keys has to be solved.<br />

Non-repudiation<br />

Non-repudiation requires a public key infrastructure (PKI: registration of users<br />

and certification of public keys by a trustworthy third party, including rules of<br />

use). At present, however, there is no such thing as a global PKI, and it is<br />

therefore difficult to obtain a non-repudiated proof of origin for e-mails from<br />

previously unknown users. In a local network a suitable PKI would have to be<br />

created for this purpose.<br />

Conformity with standards<br />

For reasons of interoperability and to protect investment, it makes sense to use<br />

Internet standards which are as widespread and broadly accepted as possible.<br />

Both S/MIME and PGP are still at the standardisation stage.<br />

Example 3: Secure voice and data communications over ISDN network<br />

connections<br />

<strong>The</strong> following example of application looks at communication via ISDN. <strong>The</strong><br />

applications to be protected are speech traffic and video conferences, together<br />

with data traffic between computer networks. <strong>The</strong> aim is to ensure the<br />

effective protection of confidential information and non-repudiated personal<br />

data transferred via the connections. It is assumed that all information that is<br />

to be transmitted is available in digital form (PCM code) and that the voice<br />

compression commonly used in corporate networks and PBXs can be<br />

deactivated for encrypted applications so that the user information channels (B<br />

channels) can be encrypted.<br />

To achieve this, an ISDN security component is to be used to protect an S0<br />

connection with two 64 kbit/s channels. It is of no consequence whether<br />

individual ISDN terminal devices (telephone, fax, PC with plug-in ISDN card<br />

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<strong>IT</strong>-<strong>Baseline</strong> <strong>Protection</strong> <strong>Manual</strong>: Oktober 2000

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